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Abstract  
The reasons for audit changes are typically poorly documented and at times speculated to 
be due to management’s desire to engage in opportunistic earnings management. This 
study examines the occurrence of earnings management around audit changes in small 
Norwegian limited firms (AS). Our dataset of firm characteristics and financial records is 
gathered from the SNF Database. Discretionary accruals are estimated for firms in our 
sample and are used as a proxy for earnings management. We present evidence that 
suggests there is no significant occurrence of income increasing earnings management 
surrounding audit changes, but we do find evidence for audit changes that may be 
initiated due to the incumbent auditor’s conservatism. We also find evidence that firms 
with small auditors that later switch to conservative big auditors are subject to larger 
negative discretionary accruals. Finally, we find evidence that audit changes in which the 
firm received a modified audit opinion in the year prior to the change are also subjected 
to larger negative discretionary accruals when compared to audit change firms that 
received an unmodified audit opinion. Our findings suggest that for private Norwegian 
firms the motivation for audit changes is not management’s desire to find a more lenient 
auditor in order to manipulate earnings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I identified essential papers by searching Oria (NHH’s library search interface for all 
available literature) for academic papers containing the following keywords in both 
Norwegian and English: auditor changes, audit change, auditor switching, auditor 
rotation, earnings management, discretionary accruals, total accruals, audit quality, 
opinion shopping, audit shopping, audit-qualifications, earnings management and private 
firms, Norwegian earnings management, total accruals 
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1.  Introduction  
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), a reactionary regulation 
enacted as a consequence of one of the largest financial scandals in the U.S., roughly half 
of the U.S. public firms registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
changed auditors without providing a reason for the changes (Grothe & Weirich, 2007). 
SOX was passed to improve the reliability and accuracy of financial statements, while at 
the same time increasing the penalties for misconduct. One of the primary roles of 
auditors is to ensure accuracy in financial statements, and therefore ensure compliance 
with standards and regulations such as SOX. Grothe and Weirich (2007) reported that a 
significant amount of these firms changed from a Big Four to non-Big Four auditor, and 
the motivation behind some of these changes is speculated to be the managements’ desire 
to manipulate earnings. The topic of auditor change and earnings manipulation is of great 
importance to regulatory bodies (i.e. the SEC) who are concerned that these changes can 
be driven by management opportunism to distort reliable earnings reporting. 
 
Given the recent case of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) vs. Troms Kraft the subject of 
auditor change and earnings management has current relevance in Norway. The financial 
scandal surrounding Troms Kraft’s Swedish subsidiary, Kraft and Kultur AB (K&K), is 
related to the reporting of fictitious revenues over a period of ten years amounting to 
approximately 1.7 billion NOK. Shortly after Kraft and Kultur had received remarks from 
their auditor PwC with regards to their accounting practices, the firm fired PwC and 
replaced them with a non-Big Four firm. It is speculated that PwC was fired due to 
management’s desire to engage in opportunistic behavior (e.g. illegal earnings 
management) (Endersen, 2013). 
 
Over the years a growing body of research has focused on examining the underlying 
motives for audit changes and its impacts on audit quality (Brandon, Carver, 
Hollingsworth, & Stanley, 2012; W. N. Davidson, Jiraporn, & Dadalt, 2006; DeFond & 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Grothe & Weirich, 2007; Menon & 
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Williams, 1994; A. J. Richardson, 2006; Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Williams, 1988). 
Although significant interest in the topic remains, most academic research has found little 
or weak evidence that auditor changes are opportunistically driven (Chow & Rice, 1982; 
W. N. Davidson et al., 2006; M. Defond, 1992; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis 
& Wilson, 1988; Smith, 1986). 
 
With a focus on the opportunistic reasons behind audit changes, studies have examined 
the topic of earnings management as a motivator for auditor changes in U.S. based firms 
(W. N. Davidson et al., 2006; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). These studies examine 
the extent of earnings management, as measured through discretionary accruals, before 
and after auditor changes. Findings largely support that there is minimal evidence of 
systematic earnings management following auditor changes (W. N. Davidson et al., 2006; 
DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). Davidson et al. (2006) extended the work of DeFond 
and Subramanyam (1998) by additionally examining the relationship that auditor firm 
size and audit opinion (a proxy for audit quality) has on earnings management. In this 
analysis they identified certain conditions where auditor changes were in fact indicative 
of opportunistic behavior when firms changed auditors following a modified audit 
opinion.  
 
The aim of this study is two-fold. First we examine the types of audit changes observed 
in Norwegian firms within our study period. We categorize the types of audit changes 
and describe some of the characteristics of audit change firms. The goal is to survey the 
types of audit changes (i.e. big to small, small to small, small to big) observed in small 
Norwegian limited firms for the years 2011 to 2012 and the distribution of big vs. small 
audit firms in the data set.  
 
Motivated by the Troms Kraft scandal, we extend the work of Davidson et al. (2006) and 
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) to small Norwegian limited firms, and examine the 
earnings management–auditor change question. We examine the occurrence of earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals, around audit changes.  Our goal is to 
identify the scope of earnings management before and after audit changes, and if earnings 
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management may be a motivation for audit changes. Additionally, the analysis includes a 
control for the type of prior audit opinion as an attempt to detect audit shopping in our 
data set. Based on prior research we make a number of hypotheses. First, if firms engage 
in audit shopping with the intent of distorting earnings we expect earnings management 
to be income increasing in the year of the change and increasing from the year prior to 
the change. Second, when firms change from a big audit firm to a non-big audit firm we 
argue that firms may be shopping for a lower quality audit and are more likely to engage 
in income increasing earnings management. Finally, when firms change auditor after 
having received a modified audit opinion we argue that these firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management. 
 
In our sample we do not find pervasive evidence for earnings management around audit 
changes, but we do observe some significant variations in discretionary accruals around 
the event. Estimates of discretionary accruals before and after audit changes suggest that 
the prior auditor’s conservatism may be a possible cause for the audit change. We also 
find evidence to support the notion that clients of big auditors, whose predecessor auditor 
was a small auditor, may face more conservative accounting practices. Results also 
support the conclusions of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) suggesting that firms 
receiving a modified audit opinion prior to the audit change pose a greater litigation risk 
and therefore the new auditor uses conservative accounting choices to mitigate this risk. 
Finally, we find evidence to support that firms that change from a small to big auditor 
following a modified audit opinion experience larger negative discretionary accruals that 
those firms that switch to another small auditor. This suggests that although all firms that 
receive a modified audit opinion experience income decreasing discretionary accruals 
prior to the audit change, if the switch is to a big auditor this results in a larger magnitude 
of income decreasing discretionary accruals. Again, this implies that the big auditor is 
more conservative with their new client. 
 
Our paper contributes to the earnings management literature by providing an analysis of 
audit change and earnings management for private firms in Norway. We identify that 
earnings management is limited around audit changes and that the external auditor has an 
 4 
important effect on the direction of reported earnings after the change. Any opportunity 
the management may be seeking is likely limited by the conservative nature of the new 
auditor. This is especially true for firms that switch auditor following a modified opinion. 
Results indicate that auditors are conservative with new clients that pose a litigation risk, 
and that this conservatism seems more pronounced in big auditors. Generally we provide 
supporting evidence for the results in Defond and Subramanyam (1998), and extend this 
analysis to private companies. This is useful information for standards setters that seek to 
find the appropriate accounting standards to ensure quality in accounting reports and 
investors that seek out quality accounting information in order to make sound decisions. 
The results indicate that audit changes are not necessarily a red flag, although cases like 
Troms Kraft suggests that some caution is still warranted. 
 
2.  Background and Previous Research 
 
2.1.  Earnings Management 
2.1.1  Earnings management – a definition  
Earnings management is not a technical term in accounting or finance, and it is somewhat 
challenging to frame a suitable definition for such a broad subject. Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) define earnings management to capture all information in financial reporting that 
has the potential to mislead stakeholders. They define earnings management as follows:  
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
firm, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 368) 
 
There are two forms of earnings management: ‘real activities manipulation’ and ‘accruals 
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manipulation’. Real activities manipulation occurs when management knowingly alters 
financial statement earnings and engages in activities that have suboptimal business 
consequences with real cash flow consequences. These manipulations can be achieved by 
a number of methods such as changing the timing or structuring of an operation or 
investment (e.g., the foregoing of a profitable investment opportunity to meet the year’s 
earnings target). Accruals based earnings management occurs when management changes 
how it applies accounting standards (e.g., depreciation or estimation method) with the 
sole objective to steer the reported earnings in a particular direction with no direct cash 
flow consequences (Zang, 2012).  
We focus of our study on the latter type of earnings management because the main 
objective is to examine evidence of accruals-based earnings management (i.e. those that 
have no cash flow consequences) under audit changes.  
 
2.1.2  Evidence of earnings management  An extensive body of literature examines the issue regarding the occurrence of earnings 
management, and the vast majority of these studies suggest that there is evidence that 
managers do manipulate earnings for a variety of reasons. Collins et al. (2012) analyzed 
32 previous studies that all show some evidence of earnings management around 
different events. These studies report evidence of earnings management around corporate 
events such as initial public offerings, stock acquisitions, stock repurchases, and dividend 
payments. However, nearly all of these studies are focused on public firms outside of 
Norway, with a large majority being based in the United States (Kothari, Leone, & 
Wasley, 2005; McNichols, 2000). 
 
Although most firms in Europe are privately held the literature regarding the occurrence 
of earnings management in private firms is limited, even more so for studies focused on 
Norwegian private firms (Coppens & Peek, 2005). The reason for the scarcity of research 
on private firms is likely to be the result of the difficulty in obtaining data for these firms. 
To our knowledge, only a small number of studies address the issue of earnings 
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management within private firms and results indicate that there is evidence of earnings 
management (Abdolmohammadi, Kvaal, & Langli, 2010; Arnedo, Lizarraga, & Sánchez, 
2007; Ball, 2005; Beatty & Harris, 1999; D. C. Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Coppens 
& Peek, 2005; Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999; Moltu & Husa, 2012; Petroni, 
Ryan, & Wahlen, 2000; Reksten & Kristiansen, 2011; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 
2008). Coppens and Peek (2005) study private firms in eight countries in Europe and 
found evidence of earnings management in six of those. Other studies have shown that 
the occurrence of earnings management in private non-US firms is particularly prevalent 
for highly leveraged firms (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2010). Moltu & Husa (2012) 
conducted a thesis study on the level of earnings management in thirteen European 
countries and concluded that earnings management is present among Norwegian private 
firms, with Norway having the fifth highest occurrence of earnings management when 
compared to the other countries. Norway ranked higher for earnings management than 
Sweden and Denmark. Reksten and Kristiansen (2011) authored a dissertation that 
investigated the level of earnings management in private Norwegian companies, and 
provided evidence that these firms use earnings management to overcome small losses. 
 
Although studies on Norwegian private firms are limited, the number of examples of 
accounting scandals in Norway (i.e. Kraft and Kultur scandal, Finance Credit scandal, 
and the Sponsor Service scandal) would suggest that earnings management is occurring 
even up to very high levels with important investment and legal consequences. While all 
earnings management is not necessarily related to fraudulent activity, earnings are 
assumed to be managed to achieve some financial reporting goal. The availability of 
financial statements for non-publicly traded firms in Norway allows us the unique 
opportunity to further examine earnings management surrounding particular events for 
these firms.   
 
2.1.3  Earnings management and fraud  There is a fine line between earnings management and fraudulent financial reporting. The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) defines fraud as “the intentional, 
deliberate misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data which is 
7misleading, and, when considered with all the information made available, would cause
the reade r to change or alter his or her judgment or decision ” .
Management is able to exercise judgment over financial reporting and this is a key factor
in earnings management. There are many ways in which discretion is applied but its end
purpose is dependent on what incentives are present . W hile both earnings management
and fraud contains some form of deliberate adjustments, fraud is clearly outside the
boundary of the law while earnings management can be either legal or illegal. Figure 1
illustrates the distinction that is made between fraud and earnings management (P. M.
Dechow & Skinner, 2000) . Dechow a nd Skinner (2000) offer s a view on how managerial
choices can be categorized and the ways in which management uses discretion to alter
accounts. On one end of the spectrum are accounting choices that can be categorized as
fraud. On the other end are accoun ting choices that can be categorized as conservative.
On the borderline between the two are aggressive accounting practices. However, the
main point of this illust ration is that there is a clear - cut conceptual distinction that can be
made between fraudulen t accounting and legal discretionary accounting choices, because
fraudulent financial reporting clearly violates acceptable accounting standards uch as the
Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ( NGAAP ) or the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS ) .
Figure 1 - The distinction between fraud and earnings management (P. M. Dechow &
Skinner, 2000) .
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Different methods are available to firms to use discretionary accounting practices in order 
to manipulate financial statements. One method is that firms may recognize revenue 
prematurely, or as in the extreme case of Troms Kraft, book fictitious revenues. The firm 
can also move costs to earlier or later periods, which should (according to accounting 
standards) be recognized in the current period. However, these are just a few of many 
available methods to manipulate financial statements (Schilit, 2002). 
 
2.1.4  Earnings management – motives and incentives  Why does earnings management occur? 
The principal-agent theory is commonly used to describe the occurrence of earnings 
management behavior. The principal-agent relationship can be described as “…a contract 
relationship where one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Because the principal and the agent 
have different interests, and both wish to maximize their own utility, the agent will not 
always act in the best interest of the principal. This problem arises due to information 
asymmetry because the agent (i.e. the management) ultimately has more information than 
the principal (i.e. shareholders). Research shows that there is a positive correlation 
between information asymmetry and earnings management (V. Richardson, 2000). 
Because the agency theory establishes the incentives for management to manipulate 
results, it also provides a framework for understanding earnings management.  
 
Another way to examine earnings management is through the use of the fraud triangle. 
Earnings management typically occurs because it is relatively easy to perform, it involves 
some kind of reward, and the risk of getting caught/litigated against is low (Schilit, 
2002). Earnings management is more likely to occur if the management has an incentive 
or faces some sort of pressure from inside or outside forces (Stuart, 2011). In addition to 
incentives and pressure, the illustrative fraud triangle introduces an additional two 
variables, rationalization/attitude and opportunity. These variables are influences on the 
frequency and magnitude of earnings management. 
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2.1.4.1 The fraud triangle - incentives  Incentives  
Incentive is defined as a firms motivation to engage in earnings management or to 
commit fraud. Top management can for example be under great pressure to meet earnings 
forecasts, either due to financial pressure or social pressure (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). 
This can occur if management is experiencing personal financial losses or is facing 
external pressure by stockholders to achieve a designated earnings level. Additional 
pressures apply to publicly traded firms when management attempts to meet analysts’ 
forecasts. Incentives also exist if the firm is under financial distress or approaching its 
debt agreements, and hence there is a bigger chance to engage in earnings management or 
fraudulent financial reporting (P. Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
Tax incentives 
Income decreasing earnings management is a common practice of aiming to reduce tax 
expenses. When there is a strong connection between accounting and taxation there tends 
to exist a higher risk of income decreasing earnings management (D. Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997). This is especially true for private firms as they do not have the same 
pressure from the capital market with regards to scrutiny of financial statements. 
Up until the Norwegian tax reform of 1992, there was a close link between financial 
accounting and income taxation. However, when the tax reform was enacted that link was 
removed (Eilifsen, 1996). This implies that for Norwegian firms there is little incentive to 
engage in earnings management from a tax perspective because the tax benefits are 
marginalized, although tax evasion as represented in the media presents an alternative 
view. For example in 2009 Norwegian firms under-reported 29 billion in taxable income 
(Ukeavisen, 2012). 
Bonus schemes  
Bonus schemes that reward individuals are also found to be an incentive to engage in 
earnings management (P. M. Healy, 1985). Accruals that defer income are more likely to 
be reported when firms have caps on bonus awards (and the cap is reached) then if they 
are without caps (P. M. Healy, 1985; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983). This is not as large 
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an issue in Norway as compared to firms in other countries because bonus schemes are 
relatively non-existent, although performance based bonus schemes have increased in 
recent times (Barth, 2005).  
Debt 
A large number of studies have shown that the debt/equity hypothesis is valid; stating that 
as the firms debt/equity ratio increases it becomes more likely that managers will use 
accounting methods that increase reported income (Daley & Vigeland, 1983; P. M. 
Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012; Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996; Zmijewski & 
Hagerman, 1981). Firms may have an incentive to engage in income increasing earnings 
management in order to get loans at a low cost or to avoid violating covenants (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). Although other studies have found relatively little evidence of this 
issue (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994). Norwegian firms are primarily funded 
with debt so we might expect that the management has incentives to engage in income 
increasing discretionary accruals.  
Financial distress 
Financial distress provides a strong incentive for managers to manipulate the reported 
earnings for a number of reasons. Here a firm may use a particular choice of accounting 
method to achieve their objective (Sweeney, 1994). DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) show 
that firms use income increasing earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations, 
while DeAngelo et al. (1994) identify the use of income decreasing earnings management 
so that management can obtain better terms when renegotiating contracts. Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) report that managers use positive discretionary accruals in an attempt 
to avoid losses and meet market expectations.  
Based on this evidence, we can conclude that firms experiencing weak financial 
performance are more likely to engage in income increasing earnings management. 
Although Norway is known for its strong economy, the recent downturn in the oil market 
has slowly been affecting the growth in the economy (Crouch, 2015). Because our study 
focuses on earnings management from 2011-2012 we assume that the impacts of the oil 
downturn are not significantly represented. 
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2.1.4.2 The fraud triangle - opportunity 
The extent of earnings management and fraud is also dependent on whether there is an 
opportunity to perform it with little in the way of negative consequences. Opportunities 
arise from lack of, or weak, internal controls and no separation of duties, but perhaps the 
most relevant to earnings management is the management’s opportunity to exercise 
discretion in the financial statements, which is often accompanied by complex accounting 
rules. Financial accounting during the 1940s and 1950s was largely based on historical 
cost, and with this came a relatively small opportunity to use discretion in the accounting 
(Christensen, Glover, & Wood, 2012). Today there exist more complex accounting 
standards that are mainly based on fair value discretional estimates, and hence the 
opportunity to engage in earnings management has increased tremendously.  
2.1.4.3 The fraud triangle - rationalization  
Rationalization or attitude refers to how one can justify engaging in earnings 
management or fraud. The mindset and culture that is present in the firm is considered to 
be the foremost driver of this justification (Rockness & Rockness, 2005). A management 
without ethical behavior fosters an environment that is highly susceptible to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Perhaps surprisingly, Norwegian businesses have reported significant 
exposure to fraudulent reporting ("Norway next to Nigeria in fraud report," 2014). 
Furthermore, the Global Fraud Survey showed that 26 percent of firms reported serious 
instances of fraud within the last two years, which was higher than Russia (16 percent) 
and highest in Europe alongside Germany. This may be the result of the generally more 
transparent environment in Norway that acknowledges and reports cases of fraud. 
 
2.1.5  Accounting standards – impact on earnings management  Norwegian firms follow the Norwegian Accounting Act from 1998. The mandatory 
adoption of IFRS for publicly traded firms was implemented in 2005. Non-publicly 
traded firms are free to choose the accounting standard they utilize. In comparison to the 
traditional historical cost accounting, IFRS is considered to be rule based while NGAAP 
is more principle based. 
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After the implementation of IFRS, many studies have examined the effect of the change 
on audit quality and earnings management (Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2013; Bryce, Ali, & 
Mather, 2014; Elias, 2012; Liu, Yao, Hu, & Liu, 2011). There has not been a significant 
body of research focused on the Norwegian market, and where studies do include 
Norway they also include other European countries in their analysis (Aussenegg, Inwinkl, 
& Schneider, 2008; Cameran, Campa, & Pettinicchio, 2014; Zeghal, Chtourou, & 
Fourati, 2012). Aussenegg et al. (2008) found that the level of earnings management 
before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS was unchanged for the publicly listed 
Scandinavian firms in their study. Zeghal et al. (2012) observed lower levels of earnings 
management for publicly listed Scandinavian firms (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Denmark), 
while Cameran et al. (2014) observed higher levels of earnings management after the 
accounting change among private companies in Italy. Results of these studies are mixed, 
but both IFRS and NGAAP provide a larger opportunity for the use of discretion or 
accruals in accounting that are based on the subjectivity of management.    
 
2.1.6  Firm characteristics and earnings management  Firm size 
Research has shown that larger firms (especially public firms) that are under greater 
political and regulatory scrutiny tend to engage in income decreasing earnings 
management (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Researchers have also investigated the 
correlation between company size and earnings management and have found that the 
accruals quality is positively correlated with company size, with small companies tending 
to engage in more earnings management than large companies (Choi & Lee, 2002; P. M. 
Dechow & Dichev, 2002). One can think of accruals quality in terms of accounting 
quality, and hence low accrual quality is associated with low accounting quality, or 
greater earnings management (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013). 
Public versus private firms 
Earnings management proxies are widely accepted in research as a measure of accounting 
quality, with the two variables being negatively correlated (D. C. Burgstahler et al., 2006; 
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Lang, Raedy, & Wilson, 2005; Lang, Raedy, & Yetman, 2003), and hence these terms are 
at times used interchangeably. The accounting quality differences between private and 
public firms vary and institutional differences are crucial to explaining the cause of this 
(D. C. Burgstahler et al., 2006). Due to the separation of ownership and control that is 
prevalent in public firms, the principal is heavily dependent on good accounting quality 
reported by the agent. If the information quality is poor (i.e. large information 
asymmetry), investors will be reluctant to provide the agent with funds and the cost of 
capital will increase. This will motivate management to provide the principal with high 
quality accounting information (D. Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; D. C. Burgstahler et al., 
2006).  
 
This incentive to provide higher quality accounting information is less prevalent in 
privately held firms because the ownership structure is often more concentrated. It is not 
uncommon for owners/shareholders of a private firm to be a member of management or a 
member of the board of directors. As a result, the cost of acquiring information declines, 
as well as the demand to value the firm on a continuous basis. In these situations the cost 
of capital may not be directly impacted by accounting quality. Because of this critical 
difference, lower accounting quality (i.e. higher levels of earnings management) tends to 
be associated with private firms (Petroni et al., 2000). Without the need to provide 
information to external shareholders the environment for earnings management exists to 
achieve other incentives. Therefore, we expect that this will also apply to private 
Norwegian firms as opposed to publicly traded Norwegian firms.  
 
2.1.7  Measuring earnings management  Proxies are required to measure the amount of earnings management. Eiman & Saad 
(2008) review the main methods for measuring earnings management: the discretionary 
accruals method, the single accrual method, the total accruals method, the accounting 
changes method, and the distribution method. All of these methods have their upsides and 
downsides, and the ultimate selection of proxy depends on the focus of the study and data 
availability.  
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This study will use discretionary accruals modeling as this method is a well-established 
and proven research method for estimating earnings management compared to other 
methods. In order to estimate discretionary accruals one must begin with a calculation of 
total accruals or current accruals. The main difference between the two accruals models is 
the input into the calculation. Total accruals are calculated using inputs of total assets and 
total liabilities, whereas current accruals are calculated with current assets and current 
liabilities. The rationale behind using current accruals models is that management has 
more discretion over current accruals than over long-term total accruals (Eiman & Saad, 
2008). Others have advocated the use of current accruals because the measures tend to be 
of substantially higher quality (Ecker, Francis, Olsson, & Schipper, 2013; S. A. 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005). A limitation of utilizing total accruals is that 
one needs to have a sufficiently long time series of data to capture the period when total 
accruals reverse indicating potential earnings management.  
 
This study will be conducted with data taken from three years (2010-2012), and therefore 
we use the current accruals method in our discretionary accruals estimation. Similar to 
other research we refer to total accruals in our discretionary accruals calculations when in 
fact these are current accruals calculated from current assets and current liabilities. 
 
Earnings reported in the income statement consist of cash flow from operations plus total 
accruals: 
Net Income = Total Accruals + Cash flow from Operations  
 
Accruals are a reflection of business transactions that affect the future cash flows of the 
business even though there is no immediate change in cash transactions (S. Teoh, Welch, 
& Wong, 1998). This is where management has an opportunity to use flexibility and 
discretion in accounting practices and hence engage in earnings management, either 
income increasing or decreasing.  
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Current accruals are the sum of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, and it is the 
discretionary portion that is of interest in this study. Discretionary accruals are accruals of 
abnormal character and are where management exercises discretion to manipulate 
earnings as they are more subjective and prone to biases, assumptions, and interpretation 
of accounting standards (P. M. Dechow, 1994). The low degree of detectability of 
earnings management in discretionary accruals by users of financial statements also 
makes it a suitable instrument for implementing the managements’ accounting objectives 
(P. M. Dechow, 1994) 
 
Healy (1985) introduced the first method for estimating earnings management by 
measuring the deviations in the normal levels of accruals, known as the discretionary 
accruals. He begins with a calculation for total working capital accruals and then uses the 
levels of working capital accruals as a direct proxy for discretionary accruals. The Healy 
(1985) model assumes that the nondiscretionary portion of accruals remain constant in 
the examined period, although subsequent research has shown that this is unlikely 
because non-discretionary accruals are expected to change due to normal business 
activities (McNichols, 2000). Furthering this work researchers, such as Jones (1991) and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), developed models to directly estimate discretionary accruals, 
which enabled total accruals to be separated into the discretionary and nondiscretionary 
portions (P. M. Dechow et al., 2012).  
 
An underlying assumption and weakness to accrual models of Healey (1985) and 
DeAngelo (1986) is that during the estimation period there exists no systematic earnings 
management (P. M. Dechow et al., 2012; Jones, 1991). This is not always the case, and is 
an inherent limitation to these models. With the development of the Jones model, this 
assumption has been relaxed. With a basis in the original Jones model that are a number 
models available today for estimating discretionary accruals directly and some of the 
most popular ones will be presented in the ‘Research Design and Methodology’ chapter 
of our study.  
 
 16 
2.2.  Auditor Change and Earnings Management   
2.2.1  Motivation for auditor changes   
There are many underlying reasons and motivators for auditor changes, but in most cases 
firms and their auditors provide no reason behind the changes (Norris, 2006). Sometimes, 
as in the case of Kraft & Kultur, the management provides a reason for the change but 
speculation still exists that the audit change is driven by opportunistic behavior. When 
Troms Kraft’s subsidiary received remarks from PwC auditors with regards to their 
accounting practices they fired PwC and replaced them with a non-Big Four firm. It is 
speculated that the audit firm was fired due to opportunistic behavior (e.g. the subsidiary 
firm was engaging in fraudulent earnings management) (Endersen, 2013).  
 
The motivation behind audit changes can be broadly classified into two groups 
encompassing opportunistic reasons (e.g. audit shopping and opinion shopping) or 
business related reasons (e.g. desire for a more effective auditor or reduction of audit 
fees) (Stefaniak, Robertson, & Houston, 2009; Williams, 1988). Stefaniak et al. (2009) 
identified the following variables as client-disclosed reasons for auditor changes; opinion 
shopping, audit fees, firm-characteristics, shareholder preferences, auditor solicitation, 
client satisfaction with the auditor, disputes over accounting practice, and client-
characteristics. The study did not identify any client-initiated reasons that fall under the 
category ‘audit shopping’. Therefore the literature leads us back to studies that separate 
motivational variables in terms of their benefits to shareholders (Williams, 1988). 
Williams (1998) suggests that audit changes related to business reasons provide positive 
benefits to the shareholders, and are therefore consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. Changes that are considered beneficial to shareholders are managements 
desire to improve the firm image with a higher quality audit or to reduce audit fees.  
 
With regards to opportunistic reasons for audit changes Davidson et al. (2006) suggests 
that changes falling under the term ‘audit shopping’ are generally not expected to benefit 
shareholders, and audit shopping may be motivated by the desire for a lower quality audit 
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to benefit management or facilitate earnings management. Audit shopping can be divided 
into two categories (W. N. Davidson et al., 2006). In the first category the management 
wishes to increase information asymmetry for purely self-beneficial reasons. One 
example is when the management wishes employ a low quality audit in order report 
inflated earnings which in turn could increase earnings based compensation. In these 
cases the management would manipulate earnings upwards and hence engage in income 
increasing earnings management. Management could also skew performance upward in 
order to mitigate the risk of getting fired for delivering poor financial performance 
(Weisbach, 1988). In both cases the management is assumed to desire hiring a more 
lenient auditor and it is expected that this will result in income increasing earnings 
management. In these cases we assume that management is operating under the principal-
agency theory and income increasing earnings management around audit changes is an 
indication of audit shopping.  
 
A second category of audit shopping occurs when the client disagrees with the auditor’s 
conservative accounting choices and hence genuinely believes that a less conservative 
accounting method reflects the firm’s true economic performance. Although this category 
falls under the heading of audit shopping, the underlying motivation is not to distort 
earnings for self-beneficial reasons.   
 
2.2.2  Audit shopping and earnings management  
An extensive body of research exists to suggest that the vast majority managers do 
engage in some form of earnings management. Collins et al. (2012) analyzed 32 previous 
studies that all show evidence of earnings management. If a firm selects a new auditor for 
reason(s) consistent with shareholder wealth maximization, we would not expect there to 
be a significant increase in earnings management. An audit shopping firm (one hoping to 
hire a more lenient auditor), however, may be more likely to engage in greater earnings 
management after the auditor change. Davidson et al. (2006) as well as DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) have studied this issue by analyzing the relationship between 
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earnings management following audit changes and whether there is a systematic increase 
in earnings management following the change.  
 
Defond and Subramanyam (1998) study the topic by examining earnings management 
(using discretionary accruals as a proxy) for a sample of 503 audit change firms for years 
1990 to 1993. They measure discretionary accruals using a cross-sectional variation of 
the Jones (1991) model as described in Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), using cash flow 
calculated total accruals. Their results find no evidence of systematic income increasing 
earnings management the year following the audit change for their sample.  
 
Davidson et al. (2006) extend the work of DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) by 
examining the causes and consequences of auditor changes with relation to audit quality 
and earnings management, while additionally controlling for prior audit opinion. 
Departing from the same methods used in Defond and Subramanyam (1998) they 
measure the extent of earnings management by using discretionary accruals estimated by 
a cross-sectional modified Jones Model using balance sheet calculated total accruals (P. 
Dechow, R. Sloan, & A. Sweeney, 1995). Based on a sample size of 1,132 firm years of 
auditor changes from 1993 to 1997 they determine that there is no significant increase in 
earnings management following audit changes. However, they do find evidence for 
increased earnings management for firms that following receipt of a modified audit 
opinion switched auditor from a big audit firm to a small audit firm (i.e. lower audit 
quality).   
 
In general, these studies have not found pervasive evidence of opportunistic earnings 
management as a reason for changing auditor.  
 
Based on these findings, we reexamine this issue as it applies to private Norwegian firms. 
Thus, our first hypothesis is:  
 
(H1): Earnings management will increase following auditor changes. 
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It is important to note that we assume audit changes are motivated by a desire for income 
increasing earnings management, and hence the underlying assumptions of the hypothesis 
are: when discretionary accruals are positive (income increasing) in the event year, and 
increased from the year before, there is evidence of opportunistic earnings management. 
It is also importance to note that if we find significant income increasing earnings 
management there is always a possibility that the result is understated because it has been 
offset by cases of income decreasing earnings management in the sample.   
 
2.2.3  Audit quality and earnings management  
Definition of audit quality  
While there is no universal definition of audit quality, DeAngelo (1981) introduces a 
definition that has been widely used among scholars. They define audit quality as a 
function of (1) the auditor’s ability to detect material misstatements (technical 
capabilities) and (2) the auditor’s ability to report the errors (auditor independence). In 
other terms, audit quality is high when the probability that the auditor will both detect and 
report material misstatements in the financial statements is high. Regardless of the 
definition one chooses to use, common to all is that these characteristics (e.g., technical 
capabilities or auditor independence) are largely unobservable, so it is crucial to have a 
proxy measure for audit quality.  
Auditor size as a proxy for audit quality  
DeAngelo (1981) examined the relationship between audit quality and auditor size, and 
argued that larger audit firms are more independent (higher probability to report 
discovered misstatements), and therefore tend to provide a higher audit quality. Her 
research supports the notion that large auditors have more incentives to be accurate 
because they have larger numbers of clients and therefore have “more to lose” if their 
reports are not accurate. Based on this it is plausible that large auditor firms have greater 
incentive to report earnings management and a larger auditor results in higher audit 
quality. Research has shown evidence that large audit firms are more accurate because 
they have greater wealth that is exposed to litigation risk, therefore this risk increases the 
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quality of their audit (Dye, 1993). It has also been reported that the rates of auditor 
litigation among big auditors are lower than that of small auditors (Palmrose, 1988). This 
may be the result of auditor conservatism, and therefore big audit firms are likely to limit 
the existence of income increasing discretionary accruals (DeFond & Subramanyam, 
1998). 
In audit quality and audit change research the size or brand name of audit firms has 
generally been agreed upon by researches as appropriate proxies for audit quality (R. A. 
Davidson & Neu, 1993; Mark L. Defond & Jiambalvo, 1993; Lennox, 1999; S. H. Teoh 
& Wong, 1993). 
 
Becker et al. (1998) provide evidence that audit quality (measured by Big Six versus non-
Big Six) is related to the occurrence of earnings management. Their study they reveal that 
discretionary accruals are higher for clients of non-Big Six audit firms (Becker, Defond, 
Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). Due to a series of mergers and business failings the 
Big Six group has now been reduced to the “Big Four” and consists of PwC, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young (EY), and KPMG. In our analysis we will include BDO along with the 
traditional Big Four firms, as BDO is considered to be one of the largest audit firms in 
Norway with a market share comparable to the Big-Four1. We will refer to these as the 
Big Auditor firms from hereinafter. This leads to our second hypothesis:  
 
(H2): Firms that switch auditors are more likely to engage in earnings management after 
the auditor change if the firm’s new auditor is a non-Big Auditor. 
 
Audit quality, prior audit opinion, and earnings management 
Davidson et al. (2006) extended the work by DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) by 
controlling for both the type of prior audit opinion (e.g. modified vs. unmodified audit 
opinion) and auditor type (e.g. switch from Big Six to a small auditor) and found 
evidence of larger levels of discretionary accruals (EM proxy) for firms that received a 
                                                        
 
 
1 See Table 4 
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qualified audit opinion and switched auditor from a Big Six to a smaller auditor. Their 
results suggest that firms may be engaging in audit shopping when receiving modified 
audit opinions (Davidson et al. 2006). 
 
Because of their findings we will reexamine this issue for Norwegian firms and hence our 
third hypothesis is: 
 
(H3): When firms choose a non-Big Auditor earnings management will be greater when 
the firm has received a modified audit opinion from its prior auditor.  
 
We believe that the impact will be greater when switching from a Big Audior to a non-
Big Auditor because the audit quality reduces when this type of change takes place.    
 
 
3.  Research Design and Methodology  
In this section I will introduce measures of earnings management, summarize the most 
relevant and common tests for earnings management and give a brief summary of the 
different models for estimating discretionary accruals. I will summarize the limitations of 
these models as well as explain the choice of the model used to perform the discretionary 
accruals estimates. 
 
3.1  Discretionary Accruals Models   There are a number of models commonly used in research to define an earnings 
management proxy (i.e. discretionary accruals). Some of the most popular and 
extensively used models are those based on aggregate accruals (>45% of earnings 
management studies) (McNichols, 2000). Commonly used models for estimating 
discretionary accruals are the Healy Model (P. M. Healy, 1985), the DeAngelo Model 
(Deangelo, 1986), the Jones Model (Jones, 1991), and the modified Jones Model (P. M. 
Dechow, R. G. Sloan, & A. P. Sweeney, 1995). The main objective of these models is to 
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separate total accruals into a measure of accrual-based earnings that are associated with 
the firm’s earnings process from abnormal accruals (i.e. discretionary accruals) (P. 
Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). Ultimately the selection of the discretionary accruals 
model in the research design should be based on the predicted form of earnings 
management. A more rigorous approach is to select a combination of models to identify 
earnings management when the form is unpredictable (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000).  
 
Models for estimating earnings management have started from rather simple proxies and 
have evolved into more advanced estimation models. Healy (1985) first examined 
earnings management using total accruals as a proxy for discretionary accruals. Jones 
(1991) developed one of the first methods for directly estimating discretionary accruals 
using the residual from the regression of total accruals on the change in firm specific 
parameters.  
 
More recently models have been adjusted to improve the power and specification with 
regards to identifying earnings management. These models commonly have their base in 
the modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) and add additional 
variables to the regression to improve the estimation. Concerns that these models fail to 
capture all nondiscretionary accruals have also led researchers to supplement the models 
with a variety of performance matching techniques (Kothari et al., 2005). Kothari et al. 
(2005) proposed a matching procedure that involved subtracting estimates of 
discretionary accruals from Jones-type models using control firms matched by industry 
and return on assets (ROA) in either the current or the previous period in the estimation. 
Kothari et al. (2005) also compare results in their study with the modified Jones Model 
and directly including ROA in the regression. They find that performance matching 
resulted in the most improved model specification, but including ROA directly into the 
regression was also a useful measure over the modified Jones Model. 
 
Some of the most popular models found in literature for estimating discretionary accruals 
are described below:  
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1) The Jones model 
Jones (1991) built upon the work of Healy (1985) by relaxing the assumption that non-
discretionary accruals are constant. The model allows for controlling for a firm’s specific 
economic circumstances and is described as: 
 
ࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ ࢻ૚ ൬
૚
࡭࢏࢚ି૚
൰ ൅ ࢻ૛൫ᇞ ࡾࡱࢂ2࢏࢚൯ ൅ ࢻ૜ሺࡼࡼࡱ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ࢋ࢏࢚ 
where: 
ܶܣ௜௧   = total accruals in year t for firm i; 
ᇞ ܴܧ ௜ܸ௧  = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1, scaled by total assets at t-1; 
ܲܲܧ௧  = property, plant, and equipment in year t, scaled by total assets at t-1; 
A t-1   = total assets in year t-1; 
α1, α2, α3  = firm-specific parameters 
݁௜௧  = residual in year t representing discretionary portion of total accruals 
 
2) The Modified Jones model  
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the original Jones Model to subtract change in receivables 
from change in revenues. In the modified model, nondiscretionary accruals are estimated 
during the event year as: 
 
ࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൌࢇ૚ ൬
૚
࡭࢏࢚ି૚
൰ ൅ ࢇ૛ሺᇞ ࡾࡱࢂ࢏࢚ െᇞ ࡾࡱ࡯࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ࢇ૜ሺࡼࡼࡱ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ࢋ࢏࢚ 
where: 
 ∆RECt  = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1, scaled by total assets at t-1 
Other variables are the same as in the Jones Model (Jones, 1991). 
 
3) The Kothari et al. model (2005) 
Kothari et al. (2005) develop a model similar to the modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991) 
that includes ROA in the regression as a performance control. Their model is: 
                                                        
 
 2 Kothari uses “sales”, which is Compustat data item number 12. Compustat data items make no distinction 
between “sales revenue” and “total revenue” (as does the SNF-database), therefore we assume that “sales” is total revenue in the SNF-database.    
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ࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ܉૙ ൅ ܉૚ ൬
૚
࡭࢏࢚ି૚
൰ ൅ ܉૛ሺᇞ ࡾࡱࢂ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ܉૜ሺࡼࡼࡱ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ܉૝ሺࡾࡻ࡭࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ࢋ࢏࢚ 
 where: 
ܴܱܣ௜௧ = is return on assets for firm i in year t.  
଴ = constant term. 
other variables are the same as in the Jones Model (Jones, 1991). 
 
3.2  Calculation of Total Accruals  In the discretionary accruals models detailed above the researcher begins by estimating 
the total accruals parameter. Estimation of total accruals is typically performed using two 
different approaches, the cash flow statement and balance sheet approaches. The selected 
method introduces an additional limitation to earnings management studies as there can 
be an embedded error in the calculated total accruals from which discretionary accruals 
are estimated. The difference between the two methods arises when the firm’s estimates 
of cash flows is not articulated in the balance sheet and the income statement (Kinnunen 
& Koskela, 1999). Although the specific variables used in the calculations vary from 
study to study, most research on earnings management use the balance sheet approach 
when calculating total accruals (Deangelo, 1986; P. M. Dechow, 1994; P. M. Dechow et 
al., 1995; P. M. Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991). A summary of some popular methods for 
calculating total accruals in common research follows: 
 
DeAngelo (1986) uses the balance sheet method to calculate total accruals where total 
accruals equals net income minus operating cash flow, which is derived by adjusting 
working capital from operations for changes in all current operating accounts.  
 
Jones (1991) defines total accruals as the change in non-cash working capital before 
income taxes payable less total depreciation expense: TA = [(∆Current Assets - ∆Cash)] 
– [∆Current Liabilities - ∆Current maturities of Long-Term Debt – Income Tax Payable] 
– Depreciation and Amortization.  
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Dechow et al. (1995) uses the balance sheet approach to calculate total current accruals 
as: TA = (∆Current Assets - ∆Cash - ∆Current Liabilities + ∆Debt in Current Liabilities - 
Depreciation).  
 
Davidson et al. (2006) define total accruals as the change in non-cash current assets less 
the change in operating current liabilities: TA = [∆Account Receivables + ∆Inventories + 
∆Current Assets] – [∆Accounts Payable + ∆Income Tax Payable + ∆Current Liabilities].  
 
Hribar and Collins (2002) advocate for the calculation of total accruals using the cash 
flow statement, where total accruals are defined as: TA = -- (∆Accounts receivables + 
∆Inventories +∆Accounts Payable + ∆Tax Payable + ∆Other Current Assets + 
∆Depreciation Expense) (Hribar & Collins, 2002). This method has been used by other 
studies that utilize total accruals calculations in their analysis (Cheng & Thomas, 2006; 
Core, Guay, Richardson, & Verdi, 2006).   
3.3  Methodological Issues and Limitations 
 
3.3.1  Detection of earnings management  Even though it is commonly accepted by researchers that earnings management exists, 
the studies addressing these issues are not without flaws. There are mainly two critical 
research design issues that arise for these studies. The first is the difficult task of 
identifying the underlying incentives for earnings management (e.g., tax incentives and 
financial distress). Second, one has to measure the use of accounting discretion in 
discretionary accruals, which inevitably contain some degree of measurement error. A 
common way to estimate unexpected accruals is to begin with total accruals, measured as 
the difference between net income and operating cash flow. Total accruals are then 
regressed on variables that serve as proxies for normal accruals, and hence unexpected 
accruals are the unexplained (i.e., the residual) components of total accruals (P. Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). Many studies have questioned the reliability and power of this approach 
(Beneish, 1997; Guay et al., 1996). Results from Jones (1991) suggest that the model is 
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successful at explaining around one quarter of the variation in total accruals. One 
assumption that is implicit in the Jones Model is that revenues are non-discretionary. 
When earnings are managed through revenues the Jones Model will fail to detect the 
managed earnings in the discretionary accrual proxy. This assumption results in the 
model having reduced detection power under certain circumstances. Although Jones 
(1991) recognizes this limitation, research suggests that revenues are subject to discretion 
by management, especially for growth firms since potential benefits are greater since 
each dollar of discretionary revenue has a greater impact on earnings (Ertimur, Livnat, & 
Martikainen, 2003).  Dechow et al. (1995) attempts to eliminate the tendency of the Jones 
model to estimate discretionary accruals with error when earnings management occurs in 
revenues by subtracting the change in receivables from the revenues term.  
 
3.3.2  Limitations of discretionary accruals models   A major limitation of the above models is the potential for measurement error in the 
discretionary accrual proxy to introduce bias in the studies’ results. In order to interpret 
the results within the context of the study it is important to have confidence in the 
estimate of discretionary accruals to capture the actual discretion applied by the 
management. An important source of error is introduced because the workflow begins 
with modeling nondiscretionary accruals and later estimates discretionary accruals based 
on firm specific parameters. Inherent to this approach is the need to understand which 
factors are causing accruals to fluctuate. The most popular approach in the literature 
specifies linear models of aggregate accrual behavior, but generally do not present 
evidence for the behavior of accruals when no earnings management has occurred 
(McNichols, 2000). The alternative approach is to directly model discretionary accruals 
based on management’s incentives for discretion, which allows for separation of the 
estimation error introduced through the estimate of nondiscretionary accruals (Petroni et 
al., 2000). 
 
The validity of the selected model in any particular research study is dependent on the 
power (i.e., the probability of a Type II error) and specification (i.e., the probability of a 
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Type I error) of that model. Model precision also depends heavily on the input variables 
(e.g. total accrual calculation). Models for estimating discretionary accruals assume that 
earnings management occurs in the test period but not in the estimation period. In reality, 
the estimation period in most studies includes both the effects of hypothesized earnings 
management and the effects of a normal level of earnings management in the estimate of 
nondiscretionary accruals (McNichols, 2000). This assumption in the research design 
tends to result in lowering the power of the test. 
 
Estimation issues also result from the selected modeling approach (time series vs cross 
sectional). In studies such as Jones (1991), a firm-specific model is used to estimate the 
correlation between total accruals and the firm-specific parameters. This model requires a 
time series that is sufficiently long in order to make reasonable estimations. Studies have 
imposed requirements of 7-10 years of data for any one specific firm which results in 
having to exclude firms lacking sufficiently long data series that leads to a significantly 
smaller data set (P. M. Dechow et al., 1995; Thomas & Zhang, 2000). This requirement 
might lead to several problems, such as survivorship bias and non-stationary regression 
coefficients (Peasnell et al., 2000). 
 
A second issue with time series data is that it implies the variables remain stationary over 
time, which is not necessarily true in the estimation period. Time series data may also 
introduce error in that over sufficiently long data sets there is a greater probability for 
structural change within a firm that could result in estimation errors (Bartov, Gul, & Tsui, 
2000; Hansen, 2002). The alternative approach is to use a cross-sectional estimation 
model. While this addresses some limitations of the time series approach, it introduces 
errors due to benchmarking each firm’s accruals based on the behavior of other firms in 
the sample, typically grouped by industry type (Bagnoli & Watts, 2000).  
 
To understand the relative effectiveness of these models in measuring earnings 
management prior studies rely primarily on the extent to which a model’s estimates of 
abnormal accruals detects earnings management (P. M. Dechow et al., 1995; M. L. 
Defond & Park, 2001; Guay et al., 1996; Kothari et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2000). 
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Dechow et al. (1995) evaluated the relative performance of the Healy Model, the 
DeAngelo Model, the Jones Model, the modified Jones Model, and the Industry Model in 
detecting earnings management. They compared the specification and power of 
commonly used tests across discretionary accruals generated by the models. Their results 
show the models have low power (type II error) when applied to samples with extreme 
financial performance and are well specified (type I error) for random samples. In the 
Dechow et al. (1995) study all model estimations are performed using time-series data 
and the balance sheet approach for calculating total accruals.  
 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) examine time series versions of the Jones 
and the modified Jones Model models and suggest that they estimate discretionary 
accruals with considerable imprecision. Contrary to these results, Peasnell et al. (2000) 
evaluated the model specification and power of three cross sectional models (the Jones 
Model, the modified Jones Model, and an alternative model called the Margin Model) for 
estimating discretionary accruals. Their findings reveal that all three models are 
reasonably powerful in detecting earnings management, but the power of detection varies 
for different types of earnings management. The Jones Model and the modified Jones 
Model are significantly better at detecting revenue and bad debt manipulations, whereas 
the Margin Model is better at detecting non-bad debt expense manipulation. The results 
suggest that if a researcher expects the manager to engage in revenue manipulation 
(which tends to be the most common type of manipulation) one should choose the 
modified Jones Model. However, it is important to note that Peasnell et al. (2000) uses 
the balance sheet method for calculating total accruals which may introduce measurement 
error into the analysis (Hribar & Collins, 2002). 
 
Inherent to popularly utilized discretionary accruals models is the misspecification that 
occurs when the models are applied to firms with extreme financial performance because 
of the mechanical relation between performance and estimated discretionary accruals (P. 
Dechow et al., 1995; Guay et al., 1996; Kothari et al., 2005). In order to mitigate for this 
misspecification and reduce the probability of incorrect interpretations in earnings 
management studies develop a model for estimating discretionary accruals that controls 
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for performance by including ROA into the linear regression equation (i.e. modified 
Jones model) as well as adjusting the discretionary accruals by performance matching 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Kothari et al. (2005) show that discretionary accruals estimated 
using their model and adjusting for the performance-matched firm’s discretionary accrual 
is the best specified estimation of discretionary accruals across a wide variety of event 
conditions they tested.  
 
When considering whether to perform the discretionary accruals estimate using the 
matched-firm approach or simply by including a performance variable (i.e. ROA) in the 
regression model it is important to understand the limitations inherent to the two 
approaches. Including the performance variable in the linear regression sets up a linearity 
in the relation between the relative magnitude of performance and the accruals 
estimation, which in reality is not always the case for a number of economic reasons 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Although an advantage of simply including ROA as an additional 
variable is that it imposes one less restriction on data availability because it does not 
require available data for a control firm.  In the many tests Kothari et al. (2005) 
performed they found that although performance matching based on ROA using the 
modified Jones model produced the best results in their study, the next best performing 
accrual measure was the modified Jones model that includes ROA. Giving consideration 
to the limitations on data availability, the minor differences in rejection rates between 
performance matching versus including ROA in the regression model, and the scope of 
this study we will estimate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model with 
the addition of ROA as an independent variable in the regression.  
 
In most research regarding earnings management utilizing Jones type models for 
estimating discretionary accruals a constant term is not typically included in the 
regression model. The inclusion of a constant term provides a control for 
heteroskedasticity that remains after deflating all the terms by total assets. Results from 
Kothari et al. (2005) also show that estimations of discretionary accruals that fail to 
include a constant in the regression increases the misspecification of the modified Jones 
model. They report increases in rejection rates by more than 20% when excluding the 
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constant term. Following Kothari et al. (2005) we also include a constant term in the 
regressions. 
 
The selection of the measure for total accruals is important with regards to the final 
estimation of discretionary accruals. The balance sheet approach has the advantage of 
allowing a larger sample size and longer time series than studies that require the cash 
flow statement (McNichols, 2000). Research specifically into the pitfalls of the balance 
sheet approach suggest that it is suboptimal because it introduces a measurement error 
(Hribar & Collins, 2002). Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that the error in the balance 
sheet approach is correlated with the firm’s specific economic characteristics. This error 
reduces the model’s power to detect earnings management and interferes with drawing 
statistically valid conclusions based on earnings management proxies. Ultimately one 
wants to choose a measure that is sensitive to the earnings management that is 
hypothesized, although this is admittedly difficult to assume beforehand. 
 
When total accruals are estimated using the balance sheet approach it may be subject to 
significant measurement bias when the firm years studied include non-operating activities 
such as mergers and acquisitions, discontinued operations, and foreign currency 
translations because these events impact current asset and liability accounts but have no 
earnings impact (Revsine, 2005). The measurement bias is especially true for merger and 
acquisition firms and discontinued operation firms. This approach results in firm years 
with mergers and acquisitions showing evidence of income increasing earnings 
management, while firms with discontinued operations show evidence of income 
decreasing earnings management. Studies that hypothesize the existence of earnings 
management could falsely conclude that that earnings management has occurred, and the 
results may fail to reject a false null hypothesis (type II error) when firm-years contain 
mergers and acquisitions. The opposite situation exists for firm-years with discontinued 
operations. Here the researcher might conclude that there is no earnings management, 
when in fact there is, and hence incorrectly reject the true null hypothesis (type I error). 
An indirect way of controlling for this bias is to control for firm growth and financial 
distress. The reasoning for this is that growing firms are more likely to engage in mergers 
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and acquisitions while financially distressed firms are more likely to result in 
discontinued operations (Hribar & Collins, 2002).  
 
These shortcomings are important considerations for studies examining financially 
distressed firms that might contain a higher proportion of firm years with discontinued 
operations (than the population in general), or studies that examine rapidly growing firms 
that might contain a higher number of firm years with mergers and acquisitions. In 
addition to the above mentioned non-articulation events, Shi and Zhang (2011) identified 
non-articulation in changes in working capital accounts and depreciation expenses, as 
well as another four accrual items (deferred income tax benefit/expense, equity in net 
earnings/losses, gains/losses from sales of PPE3 and investments, as well as other funds 
from operations) as responsible for the differences between the two methods. One 
method to control for possible errors introduced via the balance sheet approach would be 
to check sensitivity of results for a sub-sample of firms that are known to be absent of 
these non-articulation events. Acknowledging the potential shortcomings of the balance 
sheet approach procedure, Richardson et al. (2005) confirms the robustness of the method 
by comparing their results from balance sheet estimated accruals to cash flow estimated 
accruals from 1988 to 2001 in their data set. They find that the results from both methods 
are qualitatively similar to each other. 
 
3.3.3  Limitations to audit change studies  
Research limitations regarding audit change studies primarily stem from the reliability of 
the survey responses when investigating reasons for audit changes on an interview basis. 
This implies the extent of open-mindedness needed when investigating reasons for audit 
changes on an interview basis because it is unlikely that a firm will report management 
opportunism as a reason for an auditor change (Fontaine, Letaifa, & Herda, 2013). Due to 
                                                        
 
 
3 PPE represents losses and gains resulting from the sale, disposal, or retirement of assets (Shi & Zhang, 
2011). We define PPE as fixed assets from SNF-database.  
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this potential flaw in interview based studies other research has examined the reasons for 
audit changes using alternative methods (Stefaniak et al., 2009). Stefaniak et al. (2009) 
performed an extensive literature review and investigated 57 previous studies that 
focused on audit changes from a client’s perspective that were not interview based and 
recognized management opportunism as an alternative reason for some of these changes.  
 
Even though previous studies that investigate both earnings management and auditor 
changes are very limited and extend to Davidson et al. (2006) and DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), these studies are limited by the available methods for determining 
discretionary accruals and relating this measure of earnings management to the reason for 
the audit change. As discussed previously, a number of models for estimating 
discretionary accruals exist, and depending on many characteristics of the firms being 
studied, the actual method of earnings management, and the size of the sample the 
models may be severely misspecified. Assuming the models correctly detect earnings 
management, the other challenge is correctly identifying the management incentives that 
tie earnings management to the audit changes. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) 
perform an extensive study and suggest that the negative discretionary accruals they 
observe in audit change firms can be explained by the conservative nature of the 
incumbent auditor. They conclude that although their results are robust to a number of 
tests, it is not possible to rule out financial distress as a partial explanation of the results. 
Davidson et al. (2006) present results that are consistent with those of DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998). This embodies the difficult nature of identifying the connection 
between the magnitude and direction of the change in discretionary accruals and the audit 
change. Another limitation of these studies is that they are event based and examine a 
number of firms that are generally grouped together because of the event – the audit 
change. During the event year some firms may report positive discretionary accruals 
while others may report negative discretionary accruals that have an offset effect; 
therefore, the results from these studies may be muted or misrepresented by the varying 
motivations amongst firms that change auditors (Davidson et al., 2006). 
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4.  Data, Sample Selection and Analysis   
In the first part of this chapter, the data selection and descriptive results from Part 1 of the 
thesis will be presented, mostly focused on the type of auditor changes we observe in 
Norwegian firms. We also analyze the distribution of auditor size with firm size and 
industry. Part 2 presents descriptive statistics and testing of our three hypotheses.  
 
4.1  Part 1 – Descriptive Analysis of Auditor Changes Observed in Norwegian AS Firms (2011-2012) 
 
4.1.1  Data source and sample selection  We begin by creating a data set of samples extracted from the SNF database for years 
2010 to 2012. As our purpose is to describe the types of auditor changes we observe for 
Norwegian AS firms in 2011-2012 we apply the following exclusion criteria (Table 1): 
 All non-AS firms. 
 Firms that have an inactive status. 
 Firms that did not change auditor. 
 Firms that meet the requirements for not having a compulsory audit as fewer 
firms faced compulsory audits from 2011 and onwards. This condition will be met 
by removing firms that have less than 5MNOK total revenues, less than 20MNOK 
in total assets, and average numbers of employees do not exceed 10 FTE’s4.   
 Firms that are missing auditor info. 
 Very small firms are removed. These are defined as having total revenues less 
than 1MNOK or total assets less than 5MNOK.  
 Firms with missing industry code. 
 
                                                        
 
 4 An FTE is the hours worked by one employee on a full-time basis.  
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Our final sample consists of 14343 observations of audit change firms in 2011-2012. 
 
4.1.2  Firm size, auditor size, and auditor changes  
Table 2 presents the distributions of auditor size after grouping firms by size into three 
different classifications. We begin by classifying firms as small, mid, and big sized firms 
based on quartiles of sales revenue. We define the small sized firms as those in the two 
smallest quartiles, mid-sized firms as those in the 50-75% quartile, and large firms as 
those in the 75-100% quartile. As we might expect larger firms in the data set are 
characterized by having a big audit firm (70.5%). This is perhaps due to larger firms 
having a reputation to uphold a certain standard or quality that may be reflected in the 
selection of a big audit firm. The rest of the results are also as expected with mid-sized 
firms having the next largest selection of Big Auditors, followed by small firms. We run 
an additional analysis on the data by removing BDO from the classification of ‘big audit’ 
firm and the numbers show generally similar results, with small, mid, and large 
companies having 23%, 20%, and 35%  of the traditional Big Four firms respectively. 
 
Table 3 illustrates that firms in the petroleum, energy, and research & development 
industry groups have the largest percentage of Big Auditors at 90%, 76%, and 88% 
respectively. When we examine the firm size distribution between these industry groups 
we see that these three industries tend to consist of a greater number of larger sized firms. 
Firms in the construction, real estate, finance, and general services have the lowest 
percentages of Big Auditors, but these industries also tend to consist of a greater 
percentage of small to mid-sized firms.  
 When we examine the data set for the market share of the individual big audit firms we 
see that for private Norwegian firms BDO has the largest market share (37%) (Table 4). 
As BDO is the largest audit firm in Norway it is perhaps not surprising that the majority 
of firms in our data set have selected BDO (when selecting a large audit firm) as these are 
private Norwegian firms that tend to operate in the Norwegian market. Small and 
medium sized firms also dominate our data set, and therefore we might expect fewer 
 35 
occurrences of the traditional Big Four firms. This is in fact more clearly observed when 
analyze the distribution of audit firms disaggregated by firm size. We see that of the big 
audit firms considered in our study, BDO makes up a large share (35-42%) across all firm 
sizes but the traditional Big Four audit firms are better represented in large sized firms 
(Table 5). 
 
We continue the analysis by looking into the type of auditor changes observed in the data 
set (Table 6). We find that the majority of firms that change auditors go from a small-to-
big auditor (34%), and the least number of changes occur from big-to-small (11%). In 
general our data set is characterized by a nearly equal distribution of small-to-small, 
small-to-big, and big-to-big auditor changes. Because our data set largely consists of 
small to medium sized firms we might expect that there are less changes from big to 
small auditors as these firms may have been less likely to select a Big Auditor from the 
start. 
 
Analyzing the distribution of auditor changes by firm size we that in general there are 
few differences in the types of auditor changes between different sized firms (Table 7). A 
notable deviation is that we see a smaller percentage of small-to-small changes in large 
sized firms (19%) as compared to the small and mid-sized firms. Big-to-small auditor 
changes reflect the least amount of changes we see in our data set, and are also the 
smallest percentage of changes made by all firm sizes (10-11.5%). 
 
We also incorporate the prior audit opinion on the types of auditor changes seen in the 
data set (Table 8). We generate an audit opinion variable using the database variable for 
auditor remarks as a starting point. We combine all remarks that are not representing an 
‘unmodified’ audit opinion and label these modified opinions. The majority of audit 
change firms have received an unmodified audit opinion in the year prior to the audit 
change, but for firms that received a modified audit opinion we observe that the largest 
percentage switch from big to small auditors (19.4%) followed by firms that switch from 
small to small auditors (18.7%). 
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In order to examine the effect that audit fees might have on the type of auditor change we 
observe we characterize audit fees into a low and high fee category. The classification is 
established as follows: 
 
ܣݑ݀݅ݐܨ݁݁ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൌ
ܣݑ݀݅ݐܨ݁݁
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ݏ
 
 
We consider any audit fee that is greater than 1% of total revenues to be considered a 
high audit fee. Table 9 shows that the percentages of firms that have high audit fees in the 
year prior to the audit change have made a change from a big to small auditor. This is 
reasonable as we might expect that smaller auditors will have a lower fee for their 
services than their larger counterparts. This information is supported by studies that show 
firms may initiate an audit change in order to lower costs associated with the service and 
hence audit fee may at times be related to an audit change (Kikhia, 2014). 
 
 
4.2  Part 2 – Earnings Management and Auditor Changes 
 
4.2.1  Data source and sample selection  In Part 2 of our analysis we have a more restrictive sample selection due to the statistical 
analyses that will be performed. We begin by extracting data from the SNF database for 
all firm years 2010 to 2012 (Berner, Mjøs, & Olving, 2014). We use years 2010 and 2011 
to create lagged variables and append these to the 2012 dataset so that our dataset for 
estimating discretionary accruals consists of only firm years from 2012, but includes 
relevant variables to estimate the discretionary accruals of the prior year. 
 
Sample selection criteria for the tests of our hypotheses are summarized in Table 10. Our 
exclusion criteria are as follows: 
 Non-AS firms, as large firms (e.g., ASA) are more likely to engage in income 
decreasing earnings management (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
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 Financial and insurance firms because their financial reporting environment differ 
from those of industrial firms, and they have fundamentally different accrual 
processes that are not likely to be captured well by the expectations models of 
normal accrual activity (Peasnell et al., 2000).  
 Firms that fall under voluntary audit regulations. 
 All firms with a missing industry code as this does value is require for cross 
sectional estimation of discretionary accruals. 
 Very small firms based on a threshold for sales revenue or total assets as these 
may introduce outliers and noise into our discretionary accruals estimations. This 
exclusion criteria also controls for the bias that can be present with small firms, 
because there is a higher chance they will engage in earnings management (Choi 
& Lee, 2002). 
 Firms that are marked as inactive, as well as firms that report no auditor. 
 All non-audit change firms. 
 In order to prevent overlapping periods of analysis, we remove firms in which the 
previous auditor was not employed for the 2 previous years. This restriction is 
consistent with DeFond and Subramanyam (1998).  
 Firm years that do not have sufficient data to calculate accruals (missing any of 
our required variables in the total accruals calculation or discretionary accruals 
model) or perform our analyses. 
 Firms with less than 10 observations for each industry in order to prevent 
estimating discretionary accruals with too few observations. 
 
Our final sample consists of 5605 firms from year 2012, and including lagged data for 
2010 and 2011. 
 
4.2.2  Estimation of earnings management proxy  4.2.2.1  Calculation of total accruals  Despite the various limitations discussed in detail in Section 3.3.3, the balance sheet 
method is still a popular and widely used approach for calculating total accruals (Hribar 
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& Collins, 2002). An explanation for this could be that the balance sheet method, at a 
research level, is less problematic based on the reduced restrictions it places on data 
availability. Although research supports that the cash flow statement approach is better 
specified, due to the limitations of variables available in the SNF-database we are 
required to estimate total accruals using the balance sheet approach. Using the available 
data we calculate total accruals using the same method described in Davidson et al. 
(2006). Total (i.e. current) accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets 
less the change in operating current liabilities:  
 
TA = [∆Account Receivables + ∆Inventories + ∆Current Assets] – [∆Accounts Payable + 
∆Income Tax Payable + ∆Current Liabilities]5 
 
4.2.2.2  Discretionary accruals modeling  We limit our estimation of discretionary accruals to the period of 2011-2012 in order to 
mitigate possible business events or economic influences that could potentially affect our 
measurements. For example, several studies show that management has a tendency to 
“dress” financial statements prior to mergers and acquisitions, and it can be assumed over 
longer time periods that one might sample a greater number of these events (Baik, Kang, 
& Morton, 2007; Erickson & Wang, 1999; Lee, Kim, Nam, & Han, 2008). Larger 
macroeconomic events, such as the economic downturn in 2008, can possibly affect our 
results as financially distressed firms have greater incentives to engage in earnings 
management (Sweeney, 1994). Although Norway was only moderately affected by the 
global recession there was a muted impact across certain sectors of the economy (Guo, 
2010). While our final sample only includes the firm years from 2012, we have appended 
the lagged variables for 2011 and 2010 to each firm observation so that we are able to 
calculate the discretionary accruals for 2011 and perform all subsequent analyses. 
 
                                                        
 
 
5 See Appendix A1 for reference to SNF database variable names. 
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We estimate discretionary accruals using the Kothari et al. (2005) modification of the 
Jones (1991) model. We regress the variables that are expected to contribute to the non-
discretionary accruals portion of total accruals and use the residual of the regression as an 
estimation of the firm’s discretionary accruals. We scale our inputs by lagged total assets 
and include a constant term to address issues related to heteroskedasticity (Kothari et al., 
2005). 
 
The details of the model have been discussed in Section 3.1 and are briefly summarized 
here: 
 
ࢀ࡭࢏࢚ ൌ଴ ൅ ૚ ൬
૚
࡭࢏࢚ି૚
൰ ൅ ૛ሺᇞ ࡾࡱࢂ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ૜ሺࡼࡼࡱ࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ૝ሺࡾࡻ࡭࢏࢚ሻ ൅ ࢋ 
 where: 
ܴܱܣ௜௧ = is return on assets for firm i in year t  
଴ = constant term. 
the remaining variables are the same as in the Jones Model (Jones, 1991). TA, REV, and PPE, and ROA 
are scaled by ܣ௜௧ିଵ. 
 
4.2.3  Control variables  In our subsequent analyses we control for a number of firm characteristics that have 
previously been shown to have a material effect on earnings management estimates.  
 
4.2.3.1  Firm growth and size  
Previous research has provided evidence that small firms are more likely to engage in 
earnings management and that small and young firms will tend to have larger 
discretionary accruals than larger more mature firms (Choi & Lee, 2002; P. M. Dechow 
& Dichev, 2002). We control for these effects through the inclusion of the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Chtourou & Bedard, 2001).  
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We control for firm growth because growing firms are more likely to engage in mergers 
and acquisitions, and firms with greater growth are more likely to have greater accruals 
(Collins, Pungaliya, & Vijh, 2012).  Following the same method as in Collins et al. 
(2012) we will control for firm growth by using a rolling window annual measure of sales 
growth calculated from sales revenue as: 
 
ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙ࡳ࢘࢕࢚࢝ࢎ ൌ ሺࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙࢚ െࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙࢚ି૚)/ࡿࢇ࢒ࢋ࢙࢚ି૚ 
 
4.2.3.2  Financial distress (Altman Z-score) 
We control for financial distress because financially distressed firms are more likely to 
engage in discontinued operations, which can result in a negative bias when estimating 
accruals (Hribar & Collins, 2002). Financially distressed firms also have greater 
incentives to manipulate earnings because the management may be motivated to take 
action to improve the appearance of the firm’s financial position (Sweeney, 1994). 
To capture the impact of financial distress on earnings management we include the 
Altman Z-score in our analyses (Edward I. Altman, 1968, 1982; Edward. I Altman, 
2002). The Altman Z-score has been found to be a relatively good measure of financial 
distress (Foster, 1986).  
The adjusted Z-score for private firms is calculated as a linear combination of five 
common financial ratios, which are given different weights: 
 
ࢆ ൌ ૙Ǥ ૠ૚ૠࡾ૚ ൅ ૙Ǥ ૡ૝ૠࡾ૛ ൅ ૜Ǥ ૚૙ૠࡾ૜ ൅ ૙Ǥ ૝૛૙ࡾ૝ ൅ ૙Ǥ ૢૢૡࡾ૞ 
where, 
 (ࡾ૚): Working Capital / Total Assets, (ࡾ૛): Retained Earnings / Total Assets, (ࡾ૜): (Earnings Before 
Interests and Taxes (EBIT))/ Total Assets, (ࡾ૝): Book Value of Equity / Total Liabilities, (ࡾ૞): Sales / 
Total Assets. Note that Altman revised the Z-score formula for private firms in 2002 (Edward. I Altman, 
2002). 
 
 
The Z-score can be interpreted in the following way: 
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 Z-Score above 2.90 – firm is considered to be in good health 
 Z-Score between 2.90 and 1.23 – warning sign  
 Z-Score below 1.23 – firm could be headed toward bankruptcy 
 
 
5.  Results – Earnings Management and Auditor Changes 
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
When we compare the values of different variables that characterize firms that have 
selected a Big Auditor or a non-Big Auditor we see some noticeable differences (Table 
11 and Table 12). In general all of the variables from the firms’ balance sheet show larger 
mean values for firms selecting big audit firms. This is as expected because we see that 
larger firms (based on total revenue) make up a greater percentage of those that select Big 
Auditors. 
 
When comparing our control variables across the two groups of firms we see that sales 
growth is smaller for firms with Big Auditors, while the Altman Z-score are roughly 
similar between the two groups. We might conclude that on average firms that have 
selected a non-Big Auditor are experiencing larger year-on-year sales growth as 
compared to the average for the Big Auditor group. In terms of financial health as 
measured through the Z-score we see on average that firms with a Big Auditor and those 
with a non-Big Auditor are in roughly similar financial health. The natural log of total 
assets also indicates that larger firms make up a greater percentage of the sample that 
selects a Big Auditor in 2012. 
 
The summary of dependent variables indicates that average discretionary accruals for 
small audit firms is slightly negative (-0.0760) as compared to big audit firms that have 
positive mean discretionary accruals (0.0231). The change in discretionary accruals is 
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also negative for small audit firms (-0.0322), whereas big audit firms show a positive 
change (0.0476). 
 
5.2  Discretionary Accruals around Audit Changes  
5.2.1  Univariate analysis of discretionary accruals  
H1 predicts that firms engage in audit shopping to find a more lenient auditor that is 
willing to accept management’s desire to opportunistically manage earnings. If this 
hypothesis holds true for the population of audit change firms, we expect discretionary 
accruals to be positive in the year of the audit change (Year 0) and increased from the 
year before (Year -1).  
 
The results for testing H1 are provided in Table 13. Mean and median values for 
discretionary accruals in the year prior to the audit change and the year following the 
audit change are presented along with the values for the change in discretionary accruals. 
The p-values for the two-tailed significance tests are also presented. In the year prior to 
the audit change both the mean and median values of discretionary accruals are 
significantly negative at -0.026 and -0.020, respectively at p < 0.01. The mean and 
median change in discretionary accruals from year 2011 to 2012 is positive although 
insignificant. In the first year with the new auditor the values are still slightly negative 
although only the median is significantly negative (-0.020 at p<0.01). Although not 
significant at traditional levels, the general trend of discretionary accruals is becoming 
less negative. Based on the assumptions of our hypothesis we cannot conclude that audit 
shopping is the main motivation for auditor changes because our first condition is not 
fulfilled (i.e. positive discretionary accruals in the event year). 
 
These results suggest that our hypothesis is not valid because we do not observe positive 
discretionary accruals in Year 0, and although the change in discretionary accruals is 
positive the value is insignificant. Our results are similar to those of DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) who argue that auditor conservatism could be the main reason for 
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auditor changes if discretionary accruals are significantly less negative in the event year, 
as compared to the year before. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) suggest that negative 
discretionary accruals in audit change firms may be due to firms undergoing operational 
changes that include restructuring charges to income. They perform a control for these 
variables and determine that the results remain unchanged with audit change firms 
reporting income decreasing discretionary accruals during the last year with the auditor. 
While we do not perform this control on our data set, it is plausible that we may be 
observing the same phenomena with regards to the direction of discretionary accruals in 
the event year. 
 
5.2.2  Discretionary accruals and audit change type  H2 states that when firms are engaged in audit shopping (i.e. searching for a more lenient 
auditor) the firms are more likely to engage in earnings management after the audit 
change if the firm’s new auditor is a non-Big Auditor (particularly true if the previous 
auditor was a Big Auditor). If our hypothesis holds true we expect that discretionary 
accruals in the year of the audit change to be positive and increasing from the year before 
when a firm changes auditor to a non-Big Auditor. We might expect the opposite if the 
firm’s predecessor auditor is a non-Big Auditor and changes to Big Auditor as the new 
auditor may be more conservative with the new client. Table 14 presents this expectation 
by examining discretionary accruals for each type of audit change in the year prior to the 
audit change (2011) and the first year with the new auditor (2012).   
 Firms that have a Big Auditor and switch to another Big Auditor have negative mean and 
median discretionary accruals (-0.007 and -0.022) in the year prior to the audit change 
although only the median is significant at p <0.01. They experience a significant increase 
in both the mean and median discretionary accruals of 0.189 and 0.039 at p<0.01, 
respectively. In the first year with the successor Big Auditor these firms have 
significantly positive mean discretionary accruals of 0.115 at p<0.01, while the median is 
positive but insignificant. Although the results tend to be somewhat inconclusive, we 
observe a slightly different change in discretionary accruals than we might expect if the 
successor Big Auditor should continue to be as conservative as the predecessor Big 
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Auditor (Defond and Subramanyam, 1998).  We might interpret this as the firm has 
undergone some structural change that has resulted in selection of a new auditor as well 
as an increase in discretionary accruals due to restructuring charges to income (DeFond 
& Subramanyam, 1998; Johnson & Lys, 1990). 
 
Firms with non-Big Auditors who switch to a Big Auditor have mean and median 
discretionary accruals that are negative and significant at -0.030 and -0.021 at p<0.01, 
respectively, in the year prior to the change. They experience a negative change in mean 
and median values, although only the mean value is significant at p<0.1. In the first year 
with the Big Auditor successor they have significantly negative mean and median 
discretionary accruals of -0.072 and -0.026 p<0.01, respectively. The direction of the 
differences in discretionary accruals for the group of small-to-big audit change firms 
seems to support the notion that clients of Big Auditors that had a non-Big Auditor 
successor are subjected to more conservative accounting practices that result in income 
decreasing discretionary accruals (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). In these cases the 
audit change does not seem to be motivated by the attempt to find a more lenient auditor.  
 
For firms that change from a non-Big Auditor to another non-Big Auditor we see that in 
the year prior to the audit change mean and median discretionary accruals are negative 
and significant at -0.069 and -0.029 at p<0.01. They experience a negative change in 
discretionary accruals, although insignificant. During the first year with the new non-Big 
Auditor they report increasingly negative mean and median discretionary accruals equal 
to -0.112 and -0.041 at p<0.01. These results seem to suggest that either the change to a 
new non-Big Auditor also results in the new auditor treating the client with conservative 
accounting choices, or these firms may be looking to engage in larger amounts of income 
decreasing earnings management.  
 
Firms in the big-to-small audit change group have in the year prior to the audit change 
positive but insignificant mean and median discretionary accruals of 0.029 and 0.003 at 
p=0.16 and p=0.23, respectively. The change in mean discretionary accruals is -0.035 at 
p=0.33, while the median is marginally positive but insignificant at p=0.58. In the first 
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year with the non-Big Auditor predecessor the mean discretionary accruals are positive 
but insignificant, while the median discretionary accruals are negative and significant (-
0.016 at p<0.1). These results are somewhat inconclusive and not statistically significant. 
There is no support for H2 as we do not see significant income increasing earnings 
management under this type of audit change.  
  
5.2.3  Discretionary accruals following type of audit opinion  H3 suggests that firms who change auditors for opportunistic reasons will have greater 
levels of earnings management when the firm changes auditor after having received a 
modified audit opinion and this will be more prevalent in firms that switch to a non-Big 
Auditor.  
 
Table 15 reports the mean and median discretionary accruals segregated by audit opinion 
type. We take the audit opinion classification from the SNF database and mark all non-
remarks or general remarks as unmodified. A modified opinion consists of conditional 
remarks, negative remarks, the auditor refraining from commenting on annual reports, 
indications of a loan to shareholders without sufficient security, misplaced tax deductions 
from the payroll, missing documentation or control, and loss of equity capital comments.  
 
For firms receiving an unmodified opinion prior to the audit change we see that both the 
mean and median discretionary accruals are negative (-0.031 and -0.020 respectively) at 
p<0.01. In the first year with the predecessor auditor mean discretionary accruals are 
marginally positive but insignificant, while median discretionary accruals are slightly less 
negative (-0.19) and significant at p<0.01. The mean and median value of the change in 
discretionary accruals is positive (0.040 and 0.006), although only the mean is significant 
at p<0.1 while the median is marginally insignificant at p=0.12. There is weak evidence 
that firms that change auditor after having received a modified audit opinion experience 
an increase in  discretionary accruals, although the results are not significant at traditional 
levels. 
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Firms that received a modified audit opinion have insignificant levels of mean and 
median discretionary accruals in the year prior to the audit change, but experience a 
negative change in discretionary accruals after the change. The mean and median change 
in discretionary accruals is -0.126 and -0.011, respectively, while only the mean is 
significant at p=0.1. In the first year with the new auditor both the mean and median 
discretionary accruals are negative and significant (-0.127 and -0.043) at p=0.05 and 
p=0.04, respectively. The results of an independent means t-test comparing the 
discretionary accruals between the group of firms with a modified opinion vs. those with 
an unmodified opinion suggests that these values are significantly different at p=0.16. 
 
We observe that firms who switch auditor after receiving a modified audit opinion 
experience larger negative discretionary accruals, therefore our hypothesis is not valid. 
We do not observe income increasing earnings management following audit changes for 
firms that received a modified audit opinion in the prior year. These observations are in 
agreement with those of Defond and Subramanyam (1998). Our results provide 
supporting evidence that clients receiving a modified audit opinion pose a greater 
litigation risk, and thus conservative accounting choices by the new auditor are used to 
mitigate this risk. This is in line with research that has found that auditor litigation is 
significantly associated with the presence of modified audit opinions (Lys & Watts, 
1994). Other explanations of our results could be that the majority of the firms that 
received a modified opinion contained issue about the going concern status and the new 
auditor takes on a more conservative approach (Ajona, Dallo, & Alegría, 2008; Butler, 
Leone, & Willenborg, 2003). Butler et al. (2003) provide an alternative explanation 
showing evidence that modified opinions that are primarily due to going concern 
uncertainty could result in firms engaging in liquidity survival tactics (e.g., delaying 
payments to suppliers) that is often associated with larger negative accruals.   
 
                                                        
 
 
6 p-value result from two-tailed t-test. Because the variances are not equal we run the test with Stata’s unequal option which causes Stata to run a Satterthwaite approximation on data (calculating the t-statistic without equal variances). 
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5.2.4  Effect of audit change on earnings management   
We further explore the audit change and earnings management question by examining the 
potential effects different types of audit changes have on discretionary accruals. We run a 
series of OLS regressions to identify effects of audit change and audit opinion on 
discretionary accruals and the change in discretionary accruals (Table 16). Discretionary 
accruals are the dependent variable in regressions 1 and 3, while the change in 
discretionary accruals is the dependent variable in regression 2 and 4. We test variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables in each regression and observe values <2 
suggesting there exists no problems related to collinearity. A minor level of 
heteroskedasticity still exists in our data and therefore we run the regressions to output 
robust standard errors in Stata. This also deals with minor concerns of normality in the 
control variables. 
 
In regressions 1 and 2 we test our predictions of H2 that firms that change auditor are 
looking to engage in income increasing earnings management, and that this is more likely 
when the change is to a non-Big Auditor from a Big Auditor predecessor. The regression 
model includes dummy variables for audit change types (i.e. small-to-small, small-to-big, 
etc.) where the variable is equal to 1 if that type of change is true. Prior audit opinion is 
included in the regression as an additional independent variable. We include control 
variables for firm size and growth and financial distress. The results of the regressions 
indicate that there is no significance of audit change type to discretionary accruals or 
change in discretionary accruals. Again we do not observe direct evidence for H2. Log of 
total assets is however positive and significant in both regressions suggesting that in our 
sample larger firms are likely to have larger discretionary accruals. This is unlike other 
research that tends to show larger firms as having better accounting quality and therefore 
lower discretionary accruals. An explanation for this could be that our sample by 
definition includes smaller firms that are privately held vs. large publicly traded firms. In 
this case firm size may not be related to better accounting quality, and larger firms may 
have larger discretionary accruals due to  larger variations in balance sheet items. The 
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Altman Z-score indicates that financial distress is significant and negatively correlated to 
both discretionary accruals (-0.069) and the change in discretionary accruals (-0.033). 
This is in agreement with research that shows firms in poor financial health (i.e. lower 
Altman Z-score) have incentives to engage in income increasing earnings management in 
order to meet earnings targets, to avoid debt covenant violations, or to avoid reporting 
significant losses (D. Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; DeAngelo et al., 1994; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994). As the Altman Z-score increases, and therefore financial health is 
increasing, we observe lower discretionary accruals. Sales growth is significant and 
positively correlated to discretionary accruals (0.146), which is expected because 
growing firms are more likely to have larger discretionary accruals that may be attributed 
to mergers and acquisitions or the need of growing their asset side to meet future demand 
(Collins et al., 2012).  Both sales growth and the log of total assets have a significant 
positive correlation to discretionary accruals, which is believable if we assume that 
companies with the largest size are also experiencing significant sales growth compared 
to their smaller peers. 
 
We further test H3 in regressions 3 and 4. H3 predicts that earnings management will 
increase following an auditor change when they have received a modified audit opinion 
in the year prior to the change. We create an audit change-audit opinion interaction term 
similar to that of Davidson et al. (2006). We define this term by multiplying the audit 
change type dummy variable (D=1 if the type of change is true) with the prior audit 
opinion dummy variable (D=1 if receiving a modified audit opinion). The result of this is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the specific type of audit change occurs following a 
modified audit opinion. Results of the two regressions are similar to regressions 1 and 2 
with regards to the audit change variables and the control variables. None of the 
interaction terms are significantly correlated to the change in discretionary accruals. 
There is however some significance between discretionary accruals and the interaction 
term. The coefficient of the interaction term for small-to-small audit changes following a 
modified audit opinion is negative (-0.261) and significantly correlated to discretionary 
accruals at p<0.1. The small-to-big interaction term which is slightly more negative (-
0.283) and significantly correlated at p<0.05. These results are similar to Table 14 in that 
 49 
we observe negative discretionary accruals for audit change firms following a modified 
audit opinion. The coefficient is more negative and significant for firms changing from 
small-to-big, which may be evidence of the successor Big Auditor being more 
conservative with their new client than a successor non-Big Auditor might be. This 
provides supporting evidence for our results in the previous section, and also indicates 
that Big Auditors are more litigation averse and prefer conservative accounting practices 
when presented with a risky client. The coefficient of the big-to-small interaction term is 
positive (0.23), but not significant. Although insignificant at conventional levels (t = 
1.36), the positive value does potentially provide weak evidence for firms changing 
auditors from big-to-small to find a more lenient auditor after having received a modified 
audit opinion. 
 
5.6  Robustness Tests  In all our analyses it is important to understand how various changes to the sample 
selection and inputs may alter the interpretation of the results.  
 
We removed very small firms from our sample in order to reduce the noise these may 
imprint on the discretionary accruals estimation. Many of these firms have zero sales 
revenue and zero values for other variables in the balance sheet. Upon closer inspection 
we find that many of these small “firms” are actually property/real estate AS firms that 
are perhaps engaged in managing the assets of a particular building or property. We re-
run our discretionary accruals estimation while including these firms. While the 
materiality of or findings do not change in value or significance we do observe an 
increase in outlier discretionary accruals calculations, as well as additional problems that 
are introduced into the calculations of sales growth and ROA. We believe removing these 
firms from the sample of firms in our study produces a cleaner more specified data set for 
the topic of earnings management and audit changes. 
 
In our total accruals calculation all variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce 
heteroskedasticity following Kothari et al. (2005). Some studies have chosen to scale 
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variables by average total assets (P. Dechow, Richardson, & Tuna, 2003). We test the 
robustness of our results by scaling relevant variables with average total assets and 
observe no significant changes in our findings.  
 
While we select the Kothari et al. (2005) model with ROA included as an independent 
variable in the regression, other discretionary accruals models may produce different 
results. We selected one of the most popular discretionary accruals models, the modified 
Jones model as specified in Dechow et al. (1995), and compared the resulting 
discretionary accruals estimates. We observe that the two models generally produce 
similar central tendencies in the discretionary accruals value although the modified Jones 
model produces a slightly positive mean value (.020), whereas the Kothari model 
produces a slightly negative mean value (-0.008). The results of Kothari et al. (2005) 
suggest that misspecification is worsened in larger samples for all discretionary accruals 
measures, and suggests this tends to be worse for the modified Jones model, as compared 
to a model that includes a measure for performance. Because we have a relatively large 
sample size as compared to most studies utilizing discretionary accruals, we use the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model. We also believe that including a performance measure in the 
discretionary accruals estimate is valid in the case of our sample. 
 
 
6. Value Relevance of this Study    Investors  
This study contributes to the body of knowledge that is useful for investors by identifying 
firm behavior that may signal a red flag. Management has the primary responsibility for 
publishing external accounting information. In order for this information to be of value to 
investors, it has to be both relevant and reliable in terms of quality. If a firm engages in 
earnings management it attempts to present data that may not be the true image of the 
economic reality and performance. In these cases the information value to the investor is 
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limited by the poor accounting quality, or in the cases of illegal forms of earnings 
management could result in large investment losses. We find that in general the sample of 
private Norwegian firms that engage in audit changes do not engage in earnings 
management, or at least do not change auditors to engage in earnings management. 
Information asymmetry is therefore minimized and investors are provided with more 
reliable information. Although the specific case of Troms Kraft stands out as a notable 
occurrence of illegal earnings management surrounding an audit change, we do not find 
significant abnormal accruals surrounding the audit changes in our sample. 
 Standards setters   The topic of audit change and earnings management has value to standard setters, such as 
the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) for Norwegian firms, and the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that is mandatory for public firms. 
The primary role of standard setters is to define the accounting language that is used by 
management to communicate with external stakeholders7 (P. Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Standards allow managers to exercise judgment within legal bounds when preparing the 
financial statements. By exercising this judgment there arises opportunities for earnings 
management. A critical task for standard setters is to determine how much judgment 
should be allowed for in the written accounting standards. It is important for them to be 
aware if pervasive evidence of earnings management exists in firms that may warrant 
modifying existing standards around audit changes. These standards should be written to 
mitigate the potential for investors to be misled by earnings management. It is also 
important to know the forms with which management abuses judgment, and which 
specific accruals practices are used. These results indicate that audit changes are not 
necessarily red flags that standard setters should focus attention on. Rather, results show 
that in general an audit change following a modified opinion results in lower 
                                                        
 
 
7 In Financial Accounting Concepts Statement 5 (Recognition and Measurement in Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises, paragraph 5), the Financial Accounting Standards Board states, 
“Financial statements are a central feature of financial reporting – a principal means of 
communicating financial information to those outside an entity.” 
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discretionary accruals that might are likely the result of the new auditor being 
conservative with its new client.  
 
7. Limitations and Future Research   
This study’s main objective is to investigate whether or not management changes auditors 
in order to engage in opportunistic earnings management. Therefore, we implicitly 
assume a causal relationship between the two parameters. There are some inherent 
difficulties in interpreting fluctuations in discretionary accruals as changes can come 
from a number of factors. These changes can for example be explained by changes in 
accounting standard. The IFRS came into force in 2005, and although previous research 
provides mixed evidence on the effects of the standards change on earnings management, 
there is a possibility that it would affect discretionary accruals (Capkun, Collins, & 
Jeanjean, 2013). An example of the differences in the accounting standards is the 
depreciation item on the balance sheet statement. Pursuant to IFRS, the value of 
depreciations in the balance sheet is more likely to be lower than firms reporting the same 
item pursuant to Norwegian rules (NGAAP). Although we have excluded public firms 
(obligated to adopt IFRS standards from 2005) our remaining sample includes firms that 
follow NGAAP and IFRS accounting practices. Future research might extend this study 
by controlling for the type of accounting standard used by the firm, whether IFRS or 
NGAAP, as well as separating these two groups of firms and analyzing the differences in 
discretionary accruals between the two.  
 
Other factors that could explain fluctuations in discretionary accruals are mergers, 
acquisitions, and/or changes in-group structure (Hribar & Collins, 2002). We attempt to 
indirectly control for these events by limiting the analysis to a smaller period of time (2 
years) which mitigates the number of occurrences of these events that may be present in 
longer time series analyses. In a more detailed study, attempting to further control for 
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these events within the data set by examining firm years for mergers and acquisitions 
evidence could yield a more powerful analysis of discretionary accruals.  
 
We experienced a few limitations due to the source of our data. The study was originally 
constructed to perform the analysis on data from years 2012-2013, but evaluation of the 
audit change variable in 2013 demonstrated a number of incorrectly specified auditor 
changes. Due to this data becoming available in November and the time frame for this 
study we had to limit data selection to 2011-2012. We were unable to utilize the cash 
flow method (SNF-database does not provide the cash flow statement) of calculating 
current accruals, and with this follows the limitations that have previously been discussed 
with regards to accruals calculations from the balance sheet method. Using the cash flow 
method may result in slightly different results as the estimation of discretionary accruals 
would be better specified.  
 
We did not control for wording in the modified audit opinions. In general the majority of 
our sample received no remarks from the auditor, whereas the next largest group is 
general remarks, followed by going-concern issues. We grouped all audit opinions that 
may be construed as negative into modified audit opinion. Future studies may examine 
the specific relationship between unqualified vs. negative vs. going-concern audit 
opinions and discretionary accruals around audit changes. Davidson et al. (2006) 
controlled for wording and did not find that the addition of this control altered their 
conclusions. 
 
Our cross sectional data provides us with a snapshot of earnings management in the 
limited study period we selected, while it might provide different results if another time 
frame had been chosen. Future studies may extend this to other two year periods (i.e. 
avoiding periods of strong recessions like 2008-2009), or extend the analysis to many 
years to see how the interpretations may differ. One must keep in mind the 
misspecification that arises in discretionary accruals models when increasing the size of 
the sample and that larger time series analyses can include events such as mergers and 
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acquisitions or economic downturns that could have an effect on the earnings 
management estimation. 
 
We did not take into consideration other variables that may have an effect on audit 
changes, such as audit fee. While we did include audit fee in initial exploratory 
regressions we did not find strong evidence to include it in the final analysis. Research 
has provided evidence that a lower audit fee relates to a measure of audit quality, and 
therefore a low audit fee may be related to earnings management (Gupta, Krishnan, & 
Yu, 2012). Future research could extend our study by examining the effect of audit fee, 
audit changes, and earnings management in more detail.  
 
As discussed earlier, our results depend on the accuracy of the accruals measure and the 
inputs used in the model. Future research could apply different accruals calculations 
models to examine their effects on discretionary accruals estimation. One would possibly 
get different results by using total accruals instead of current accruals, by using different 
formulas for calculating accruals, or by using the cash flow statement instead of the 
balance sheet method.  
 
8. Summary and Conclusion  
 
We examine the occurrence of earnings management surrounding audit changes for 
Norwegian AS firms and whether audit changes are driven by management’s desire to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings. 
 
The analysis shows that for the study period there there is not a significant level of 
income increasing earnings management after audit changes. Results suggest that there is 
evidence that auditor conservatism may be a motivation for firms to change auditor, when 
the previous auditor prefers conservative practices that the firm’s management believes 
does not represent the true financial picture of the firm. Evidence also suggests that 
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clients of Big Auditors that had a non-Big Auditor predecessor may be subjected to more 
conservative accounting and therefore experience larger negative discretionary accruals. 
Audit changes where the firm received a modified audit opinion in the year prior to the 
change results in significantly larger negative discretionary accruals, again indicating the 
successor auditor likely being more conservative with its new client. Finally, results 
suggest that firms that receive a modified audit opinion prior to the audit change 
experience larger negative discretionary accruals when switching from a non-Big Auditor 
to a Big Auditor when compared to these same firms that switch from a non-Big Auditor 
to another non-Big Auditor. These results are similar to those of DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998), although differ slightly from Davidson et al. (2006) who finds 
slight evidence to support the notion that an audit change to a non-Big Auditor following 
a modified opinion results in more positive discretionary accruals. We find weak 
evidence to support the results of Davidson et al. (2006), although our results are not 
significant at traditional levels. It is plausible that for Norwegian AS firms there are 
fewer incentives to engage in earnings management and therefore the prevalence of 
income increasing earnings management is muted.  
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Tables  
Part 1 –  Descriptive Analysis of Auditor Changes Observed in Norwegian AS Firm (2011-2012)   
Table 1 – Sample selection criteria for auditor changes, 2011-2012 Sample Selection Criteria  Firm years Firm years 2012 263 675 Exclusion criteria:  Remove non-private limited liability (AS) firms  -39 779 
Firm inactive in 2012 -8 480 
Non-audit change firms -127 890 Meet the requirements for not having compulsory audit & small firms  -72 738 
Missing auditor info -418 Very small firms (income <1MNOK or total assets <5MNOK) -6 Missing industry code  -21 # of observations in final sample 14 343  
 
Table 2 – Comparison of firm size and audit firm size, 2011-2012 
Firm Size non-Big Auditor Big Auditor % with Big Auditor 
Small 3022 4150 57.9% Mid 1416 2170 60.5% Large 1057 2528 70.5% Total 5495 8848 61.7%     
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Table 3– Industries and audit firm size, 2011-2012 
Industry non-Big Auditor Big Auditor Total Firms % with Big Auditor Primary Industry 81 170 251 68% Petroleum 16 139 155 90% Manufacturing 389 745 1134 66% Energy 30 95 125 76% Construction 943 1344 2287 59% Trade 1362 2249 3611 62% Shipping 74 130 204 64% Transport 396 635 1031 62% IT 199 351 550 64% Finance 149 161 310 52% Real Estate 896 1503 2399 63% General Services 642 844 1486 57% Research & Development 2 15 17 88% Public Sector 316 467 783 60% Total 5495 8848 14343 62%  
Table 4 – Audit firm market share  
Auditor Firms with Auditor Percent 
non-Big Auditor 5495 38% 
E&Y 979 7% 
Deloitte 698 5% 
KPMG 716 5% 
PWC 1206 8% 
BDO 5249 37% Total 14343 100%  
Table 5 – Distribution of auditor and firm size 
  Firm Size 
Auditor Firm Small Medium Large 
non-Big Auditor 42 % 39 % 29 % 
E&Y 6 % 5 % 9 % Deloitte 5 % 4 % 6 % KPMG 5 % 3 % 7 % PWC 7 % 7 % 13 % 
BDO 35 % 41 % 36 % 
Total # Firms 7172 3586 3585 
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Table 6 - Description of types of auditor changes, 2011-2012 
Type of Audit Change # of Firms Percentage of Firms 
Small-to-small     3899 27.2% Small-to-big 4856 33.9% Big-to-big 3992 27.8% Big-to-small 1596 11.1% Total 14343 100%  
 
Table 7 – Distribution of types of auditor changes by firm size, 2011-20121 
  Firm Size 
Type of Audit Change Small Medium Large 
Small-to-small     2196 1010 693 30.6 % 28.2 % 19.3 % 
Small-to-big 2258 1337 1261 31.5 % 37.3 % 35.2 % 
Big-to-big 1892 833 1267 26.4 % 23.2 % 35.3 % 
Big-to-small 826 406 364 11.5 % 11.3 % 10.2 % 1Percentages displayed are column percentages.  
Table 8 – Distribution of auditor change categorized by prior audit opinion 
 Prior Audit Opinion  Type of Audit Change Unmodified Modified % of audit change firms with modified opinion Big to Big 3567 396 10.0% Big to Small 1286 310 19.4% Small to Small 3169 730 18.7% Small to Big 4272 584 12.0% Total 12,294 2,020 14.1%  
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Table 9- Distribution of audit change types categorized by audit fee1 
 Audit Fee  
Type of Audit Change Low High % of changes with high fee Big to Big 3044 285 8.6% Big to Small 1239 150 10.8% Small to Small 2801 209 6.9% Small to Big 4012 246 5.8% Total 11096 890 7.4%  1Prior year audit fee    
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Part 2 – Earnings Management and Auditor Changes 
 
Table 10 – Sample selection criteria for earnings management analysis, 2011-2012 
Sample Selection Criteria Firm Years All firm years - 2012 263675 Exclude: 223896 Remove non-AS firms   Removed finance and insurance firms 149711 Firms that meet the requirements for not having compulsory audit as of 2011 55103 Firms that do not have an industry code 54966 Very small firms (<1MNOK in revenue or 5MNOK in asset) 32214 Inactive firms and firms without an auditor 31338 Non-audit change firms 6552 Firms which previous auditor not employed for previous 2 years 5975 Missing variables required to estimate DCA 5695 Less than 10 observations for each industry code 5605     # of observations in final sample 5605  
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Table 11 – Descriptive statistics for firms with a Big Auditor 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Employees 3,837 34.98 164.8 0 6598 
Total Revenue 3,837 204225 4.170e+06 1000 2.520e+08 
Total Assets 3,837 259821 6.998e+06 5000 4.300e+08 
PPE 3,837 111766 3.926e+06 0 2.410e+08 Accounts Receivable 3,837 46195 638199 -5054 3.540e+07 Inventories 3,837 10300 79636 -68 3.322e+06 Current Assets 3,837 66957 663259 -4901 3.540e+07 Accounts Payable 3,837 11762 248554 -286 1.520e+07 ROA 3,837 0.0704 0.141 -0.503 0.508 
Control Variables1:      Sales Growth 3,608 0.168 0.668 -0.954 5.076 
Altman Z-Score 3,837 2.572 1.620 -0.720 7.775 
Log of Total Assets 3,837 10.04 1.373 8.517 19.88 
Dependent Variables2:     DCA 3,837 0.0231 1.610 -7.933 6.994 Change in DCA 3,837 0.0476 2.016 -9.191 9.303 
1Sales growth and Altman Z-scores are winsorized at the 1% level to remove the noise due to outliers that report very abnormal balance sheet items 2Discretionary accruals are winsorized at the 1% level. 
    
 73 
Table 12 – Descriptive statistics for firms with a non-Big Auditor 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Employees 1,768 17.01 27.31 0 303 
Total Revenue 1,768 37132 84832 1006 2.803e+06 
Total Assets 1,768 32003 144555 5002 5.012e+06 
PPE 1,768 6951 36539 0 1.004e+06 Accounts Receivable 1,768 8226 24540 -67 673652 Inventories 1,768 3127 7578 0 124622 Current Assets 1,768 16308 42450 18 1.223e+06 Accounts Payable 1,768 3041 6976 -65 97185 ROA 1,768 0.0703 0.150 -0.503 0.508 
Control Variables1:      Sales Growth 1,685 0.199 0.728 -0.954 5.076 Altman Z-Score 1,768 2.590 1.528 -0.720 7.775 
Log of Total Assets 1,768 9.610 0.935 8.518 15.43 
Dependent Variables2:     DCA 1,768 -0.0760 1.616 -7.933 6.994 Change in DCA 1,768 -0.0322 1.979 -9.191 9.303 
1Sales growth and Altman Z-scores are winsorized at the 1% level to remove the noise due to outliers that report very abnormal balance sheet items 2Discretionary accruals are winsorized at the 1% level.    
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Table 13 – Discretionary accruals for audit change firms during the period 2011-2012a   
Year Relative to Auditor Change 
Discretionary Accruals 
Mean Median 
Year -1 (2011) -0.026 -0.020 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)     Change from  -1 to Year 0 0.022 0.005 
(p-value) (0.20) (0.17)     Year 0 (2012) -0.008 -0.020 
(p-value) (0.35) (0.00) 
aDiscretionary accruals are computed using the Kothari et al. (2005) model. 
1p-values for the means are from two-tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean equals 0 (i.e. no earnings management. p-values for the medians are from two-tailed Wilcoxian sign rank tests of the null hypothesis that the median (i.e. central tendency) equals 0.     
Table 14 – Discretionary accruals around audit changes segregated by audit change type     2011 Change DCA 2012 
    
Big Auditor Successor 
non-Big Auditor Successor 
Big Auditor Successor 
non-Big Auditor Successor 
Big Auditor Successor 
non-Big Auditor Successor 
Big Auditor Predecessor 
Mean -0.007 0.029 0.189 -0.035 0.155 0.005 
(p-value) (0.36) (0.16) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.47) 
Median -0.022 0.003 0.039 0.004 0.002 -0.016 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.58) (0.35) (0.08) 
n 1609 546 1609 546 1609 546 
non-Big Auditor Predecessor 
Mean -0.030 -0.069 -0.055 -0.031 -0.072 -0.112 
(p-value) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) 
Median -0.021 -0.029 -0.003 -0.016 -0.026 -0.041 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) 
n 2228 1222 2228 1222 2228 1222 1p-values for the means are from two-tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean equals 0 (i.e. no earnings management. p-values for the medians are from two-tailed Wilcoxian sign rank tests of the null hypothesis that the median (i.e. central tendency) equals 0.   
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Table 15 – Discretionary accruals around audit changes segregated by audit opinion type 
  Prior Audit Opinion 
 Modified  Unmodified Year Relative to Auditor Change 
DCA  DCA Mean Median   Mean Median 
Year -1 (2011) 0.015 -0.023  -0.031 -0.020 (p-value) (0.34) (0.16)  (0.00) (0.00)        Change from  -1 to Year 0 -0.126 -0.011  0.040 0.006 (p-value) (0.10) (0.30)  (0.07) (0.12)        Year 0 (2012) -0.127 -0.043  0.006 -0.019 (p-value) (0.05) (0.04)   (0.39) (0.00) 
1p-values for the means are from two-tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean equals 0 (i.e. no earnings management. p-values for the medians are from two-tailed Wilcoxian sign rank tests of the null hypothesis that the median (i.e. central tendency) equals 0.   
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Table 16 – Ordinary Least Squares regression resultsa 
    
1: Discretionary Accruals (Year 0) 
2:  Change in Discretionary Accruals  
3: Discretionary Accruals (Year 0) 
4:  Change in Discretionary Accruals  
Audit Change Dummy Variables1 
Small-to-Small 0.001 0.049 0.031 0.074 (0.01) (0.60) (0.48) (0.90) 
Small-to-Big 0.017 -0.003 0.041 0.011 (0.32) (0.04) (0.74) (0.15) 
Big-to-Small  0.073 0.008 0.019 -0.028 (0.95) (0.08) (0.24) (0.27) 
 Prior Audit Opinion2  -0.103 -0.106 -- --   (1.27) (1.03)     
Control Variables 
Log of Total Assets 
0.253 0.263 0.252 0.263 
(13.22)*** (10.89)*** (13.18)*** (10.85)*** 
Altman Z-score -0.069 -0.033 -0.069 -0.033 (4.72)*** (1.72)* (4.76)*** (1.69)* 
Sales Growth 0.146 0.094 0.147 0.094 (2.42)** (1.11) (2.43)** (1.11) 
Audit Change - Audit Opinion Interaction Term3 
Small-to-Small -- -- -0.261 -0.219   (1.75)* (1.14) Small-to-Big  -- -- -0.283 -0.17   (2.13)** (1.00) Big-to-Small  -- -- 0.23 0.137     (1.36) (0.66) 
 Constant -2.361 -2.512 -2.356 -2.521  (11.01)*** (9.11)*** (11.00)*** (9.10)*** 
 R2 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03   N 5,605 5,605 5,605 5,605 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 aFour regressions are run with discretionary accruals and change in discretionary accruals as the dependent variables. The Change in Discretionary Accruals is calculated as the difference between discretionary accruals in the audit change year and the year prior to the audit change. Variables are winsorized at the 1% level to remove outliers. Coefficients and t-statistics are reported from regression with robust standard errors. VIF tests show no problems related to collinearity. 1Audit change dummy variables equal 1 if change type is true. 2Prior audit opinion dummy variable equals 0 if unmodified and 1 if modified opinion. 3Audit interaction term is calculated by multiplying the prior audit opinion variable by the audit change type variable.    
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Appendix  
Appendix A1 – Variables Used From SNF Database 
Name of Variable  SNF database variable 
Accounts receivable (fordr) Inventories (varer) Current assets (oml) Fixed assets (PPE) (vardrmdl) Accounts payable (levgj) Income tax payable (betsk) Current liabilities (kgjeld) Total Assets (sumeiend) Revenue (totinn) Working Capital (Curr Ass. – Curr Lia.) (oml – kgjeld) EBIT or (EBITDA - DA) (ebitda - avskr) Book value of equity (ak) Total liabilities (gjeld) Total revenues (REV) (totinn) Sales (sales revenues)  (salgsinn) Retained earnings  (opptjek) Audit opinion (revanm) Auditor fee (revhon) Auditor change (rev_skift) Auditor organization number (revorgnr) Auditor name  (revnavn) Firm status – Active/Inactive (aktiv)   
